Gitlab Cli Skills

⬇ 2,900 downloads · ⭐ 2

High Risk

Comprehensive GitLab CLI (glab) command reference and workflows for all GitLab operations. Use when working with merge requests, CI/CD pipelines, issues, releases, repositories, authentication, variables, labels, milestones, snippets, or any glab command. Covers 37+ sub-commands including glab mr, glab ci, glab issue, glab repo, glab release, glab variable, and more.

H:4 D:4 A:3 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PERSISTENCE FS_READ_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_FILES ACT_POST_PUBLIC PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

❌ Read workspace
❌ Write workspace
✅ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages✅ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

APPROVE_POST: Can post publicly
SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

SSH key access patterns in: SKILL.md high

Mitigation: Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing.

Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION critical

Mitigation: Remove system modification commands

Command injection risk: MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, TIRITH_DOCKER_UNTRUSTED_REGISTRY critical

Mitigation: Remove dangerous system commands.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:gitlab-cli-skills:1.12.1",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-28T09:05:37.845Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Gitlab Cli Skills",
    "version": "1.12.1",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Comprehensive GitLab CLI (glab) command reference and workflows for all GitLab operations. Use when working with merge requests, CI/CD pipelines, issues, releases, repositories, authentication, variables, labels, milestones, snippets, or any glab command. Covers 37+ sub-commands including glab mr, glab ci, glab issue, glab repo, glab release, glab variable, and more.",
    "publisher": "ClawHub",
    "source": {
      "channel": "clawhub",
      "slug": "gitlab-cli-skills",
      "owner": "vince-winkintel",
      "downloads": 2900,
      "stars": 2
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "cb37610da6221d902d2c7687f0266d1a404a0eb82ead39450258c009004589f4",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [
      {
        "service": "code_hosting",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": true,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 3,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "ACT_POST_PUBLIC",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "CRED_SSH",
        "name": "SSH Key Access",
        "description": "Accesses SSH keys in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION: Modifying system permissions or configuration"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, TIRITH_DOCKER_UNTRUSTED_REGISTRY: Dangerous system commands or Windows exploitation"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 6 security patterns (6 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "APPROVE_POST",
        "reason": "Can post publicly"
      },
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "SSH key access patterns in: SKILL.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove system modification commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, TIRITH_DOCKER_UNTRUSTED_REGISTRY",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove dangerous system commands."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:44: A practical pattern is one env file per actor, for example `~/.config/openclaw/e",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:3570: 2. **Use descriptions** - Track token purpose and owner",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:1268: ### PowerShell",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE [HIGH] SKILL.md:1227: echo \"autoload -U compinit; compinit\" >> ~/.zshrc",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_DOCKER_UNTRUSTED_REGISTRY [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:704: docker pull registry.gitlab.com/group/project/image:tag",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}