TARDIS

· v1.2.0

Medium Risk

Track elapsed time from a set epoch with tamper-evident locking. Like an analog Hobbs meter but digital. Use for tracking uptime, service hours, time since events, sobriety counters, project duration, equipment runtime. Supports create, lock (seal), check, verify against external hash, list, and export operations.

H:3 D:4 A:2 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Ensure network access is necessary and documented

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:hour-meter:1.2.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T03:24:21.778Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "TARDIS",
    "version": "1.2.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Track elapsed time from a set epoch with tamper-evident locking. Like an analog Hobbs meter but digital. Use for tracking uptime, service hours, time since events, sobriety counters, project duration, equipment runtime. Supports create, lock (seal), check, verify against external hash, list, and export operations.",
    "publisher": "rm289",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "c04d6a8fc31d478f0cade259a421b02e1ea61a3dedc24bb0365ccada8c71fd69",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [
      {
        "service": "email",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      },
      {
        "service": "messaging",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 3,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 2,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Access to critical system directories"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: HTTP client library imports that enable external communication"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 3 security patterns (9 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H3: Shell/code execution or persistence detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A2: Service integrations detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Ensure network access is necessary and documented"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/check-webhook-services.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/check-webhook-services.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/meter.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/meter.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/sendgrid_webhook.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/sendgrid_webhook.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "OBFUSCATION_BASE64_LARGE [MEDIUM] README.md:3: [![ClawHub](https://img.shields.io/badge/ClawHub-TARDIS-blue?logo=data:image/svg",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/check-webhook-services.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/check-webhook-services.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/meter.py:20: import urllib.request",
      "file_path": "scripts/meter.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES [HIGH] scripts/meter.py:61: return Path(os.environ.get(\"METER_STORAGE\", DEFAULT_STORAGE))",
      "file_path": "scripts/meter.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] scripts/meter.py:31: if os.environ.get(\"SENDGRID_API_KEY\"):",
      "file_path": "scripts/meter.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/sendgrid_webhook.py:37: import urllib.request",
      "file_path": "scripts/sendgrid_webhook.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] scripts/sendgrid_webhook.py:96: return os.environ.get(\"SENDGRID_WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY\", \"\").strip()",
      "file_path": "scripts/sendgrid_webhook.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:62: - Sync folder to Dropbox/iCloud/Google Drive for cloud backup",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}