AgentMail sending and receiving with Python scripts
ยท v1.0.0
python files which are used to send an email and to download received emails from an inbox. The email provider is agentmail.to, which offers an API. This way of email handling is very AI-agent friendly.
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Mitigation: Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops
Mitigation: Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Mitigation: Minimize access to environment variables
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๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:python-agentmail-send-receive:1.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-07T07:31:17.188Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "AgentMail sending and receiving with Python scripts",
"version": "1.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "python files which are used to send an email and to download received emails from an inbox. The email provider is agentmail.to, which offers an API. This way of email handling is very AI-agent friendly.",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "a469ea447de754ba5196676608c213aea316967d85fed9c370a6dcc098f42bb6",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": true,
"writes_user_home": true,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": true
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 1,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
"FS_WRITE_USER",
"FS_DELETE",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "FILE_DELETE",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Can delete files in: check_mail.py"
},
{
"code": "RESOURCE_ABUSE",
"name": "Resource Abuse Risk",
"description": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP detected: Infinite loop without clear exit condition"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL: Instructs agent to install external binary or package"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE: Redirecting output to home directory dotfiles (shell config, SSH keys, etc.)"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS: Reading environment variables that may contain secrets"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 6 security patterns (6 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A1: Local side effects only",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops"
},
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments"
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE",
"severity": "high"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS",
"severity": "medium",
"mitigation": "Minimize access to environment variables"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "check_mail.py",
"file_path": "check_mail.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "send_email.py",
"file_path": "send_email.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] check_mail.py:77: api_key = os.getenv(\"AGENTMAIL_API_KEY\")",
"file_path": "check_mail.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP [HIGH] check_mail.py:59: while True:",
"file_path": "check_mail.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] send_email.py:7: client = AgentMail(api_key=os.getenv(\"AGENTMAIL_API_KEY\"))",
"file_path": "send_email.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:34: uv pip install --python venv/bin/python agentmail python-dotenv",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE [HIGH] SKILL.md:44: cat > ~/.openclaw/workspace/agentmail/.env << 'EOF'",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}