๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ SafeAgentSkills

proactive-tasks

ยท v1.2.3

Medium Risk

Proactive goal and task management system. Use when managing goals, breaking down projects into tasks, tracking progress, or working autonomously on objectives. Enables agents to work proactively during heartbeats, message humans with updates, and make progress without waiting for prompts.

H:3 D:2 A:1 C:1

โš ๏ธ Hazard Flags

EXEC FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS

๐Ÿ“‹ Capabilities

Execution

  • โœ… Shell execution
  • โŒ Code execution
  • โŒ Install dependencies
  • โŒ Persistence
  • Privilege: user

Filesystem

  • โœ… Read workspace
  • โœ… Write workspace
  • โŒ Read home
  • โœ… Write home
  • โŒ Read system
  • โŒ Delete

Network

  • Egress: any
  • โŒ Ingress

Credentials

  • โŒ Environment vars
  • โŒ Credential files
  • โŒ Browser data
  • โŒ Keychain

Actions

โŒ send messagesโŒ post publicโŒ purchaseโŒ transfer moneyโŒ deployโŒ delete external

๐Ÿ”’ Containment

Level: elevated

Required:
  • SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
  • LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

โšก Risks

Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md high

Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION) critical

Mitigation: Remove deceptive language. Tools must be transparent about their behavior.

Want a deeper analysis?

This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.

๐Ÿง  Deep Analysis โ€” $5.00

๐Ÿšจ Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

๐Ÿ“„ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:proactive-tasks:1.2.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T02:27:52.681Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "proactive-tasks",
    "version": "1.2.3",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Proactive goal and task management system. Use when managing goals, breaking down projects into tasks, tracking progress, or working autonomously on objectives. Enables agents to work proactively during heartbeats, message humans with updates, and make progress without waiting for prompts.",
    "publisher": "ClawHub",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "562e5b18ce43011f6323de29f8d6da2e9093a16ae56faa4c60ef171f2be0831c",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": false,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web",
      "documents"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 3,
      "D": 2,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "PI_WEB",
      "PI_DOCUMENTS"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
        "name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
        "description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 3 security patterns (2 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H3: Shell/code execution or persistence detected",
      "D": "D2: Network + file access",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "elevated",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION)",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove deceptive language. Tools must be transparent about their behavior."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "package.json",
      "file_path": "package.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/task_manager.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/task_manager.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:212: 2. **Test** - Actually run/verify the outcome from user perspective",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}