Personaldatahub

· v0.1.0

Low Risk

Pull personal data (emails, issues) and propose outbound actions (drafts, replies) through the PersonalDataHub access control gateway. Data is filtered, redacted, and shaped by the owner's policy before reaching the agent.

H:2 D:4 A:0 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

❌ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
❌ Write workspace
✅ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:PersonalDataHub:0.1.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T15:54:40.180Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Personaldatahub",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Pull personal data (emails, issues) and propose outbound actions (drafts, replies) through the PersonalDataHub access control gateway. Data is filtered, redacted, and shaped by the owner's policy before reaching the agent.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "ae6f7ba5e21a18115eb8b26b7e8c51a0a4189b869d6394e503580978648ed6b5",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": false,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 2,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 0,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 2 security patterns (2 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H2: Filesystem writes or ingress detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A0: No side effects detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/hub-client.d.ts",
      "file_path": "dist/hub-client.d.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/hub-client.js",
      "file_path": "dist/hub-client.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/index.d.ts",
      "file_path": "dist/index.d.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/index.js",
      "file_path": "dist/index.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/prompts.d.ts",
      "file_path": "dist/prompts.d.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/prompts.js",
      "file_path": "dist/prompts.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/setup.d.ts",
      "file_path": "dist/setup.d.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/setup.js",
      "file_path": "dist/setup.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/tools.d.ts",
      "file_path": "dist/tools.d.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "dist/tools.js",
      "file_path": "dist/tools.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:16: Access personal data from Gmail, GitHub, and other sources through the PersonalD",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}