๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ SafeAgentSkills

Outlook Plus

ยท v1.9.0

High Risk

Read, search, and manage Outlook emails and calendar via Microsoft Graph API. Use when the user asks about emails, inbox, Outlook, Microsoft mail, calendar events, or scheduling.

H:4 D:4 A:0 C:1

โš ๏ธ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV PI_WEB

๐Ÿ“‹ Capabilities

Execution

  • โœ… Shell execution
  • โŒ Code execution
  • โŒ Install dependencies
  • โŒ Persistence
  • Privilege: admin

Filesystem

  • โŒ Read workspace
  • โŒ Write workspace
  • โŒ Read home
  • โŒ Write home
  • โŒ Read system
  • โŒ Delete

Network

  • Egress: any
  • โŒ Ingress

Credentials

  • โœ… Environment vars
  • โŒ Credential files
  • โŒ Browser data
  • โŒ Keychain

Actions

โŒ send messagesโŒ post publicโŒ purchaseโŒ transfer moneyโŒ deployโŒ delete external

๐Ÿ”’ Containment

Level: maximum

Required:
  • SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
  • LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

โšก Risks

Pipe-to-shell pattern detected (curl|bash) in: scripts/outlook-setup.sh critical

Mitigation: Do not execute. Review source for malicious intent.

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION critical

Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT medium

Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions

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๐Ÿšจ Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

๐Ÿ“„ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:outlook:1.9.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T13:45:16.798Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Outlook Plus",
    "version": "1.9.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Read, search, and manage Outlook emails and calendar via Microsoft Graph API. Use when the user asks about emails, inbox, Outlook, Microsoft mail, calendar events, or scheduling.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "fa9ca824dbad09691eefc445bf1d2f29b2737deae17b0640a1105cdb235dd177",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": false,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 0,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PIPE_TO_SHELL",
        "name": "Pipe to Shell",
        "description": "Downloads and executes remote code (curl|bash pattern) in: scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION: Access to critical system directories"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (12 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A0: No side effects detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Pipe-to-shell pattern detected (curl|bash) in: scripts/outlook-setup.sh",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Do not execute. Review source for malicious intent."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
        "severity": "medium",
        "mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/outlook-calendar.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-calendar.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/outlook-mail.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-mail.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/outlook-setup.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/outlook-token.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-token.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/outlook-calendar.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-calendar.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/outlook-mail.sh:100: FOLDER_ID=$(find_folder_id \"$2\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-mail.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/outlook-mail.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-mail.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/outlook-setup.sh:168: chmod 600 \"$CONFIG_FILE\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/outlook-setup.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/outlook-setup.sh:25: RED='\\033[0;31m'",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] scripts/outlook-setup.sh:25: RED='\\033[0;31m'",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/outlook-token.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/outlook-token.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:276: - **Local credential storage**: Client ID, client secret, and OAuth tokens are s",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:88: ./scripts/outlook-mail.sh read <id>               # Read email content",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}