Yatta! - Task & Capacity Management

· v0.2.2

High Risk

Personal productivity system for task and capacity management. Create and organize tasks with rich attributes (priority, effort, complexity, tags), track time and streaks, manage capacity across projects and contexts, view Eisenhower Matrix prioritization, sync calendar subscriptions, handle delegation and follow-ups, and get AI-powered insights. Supports batch operations, multi-project workflows, and real-time capacity planning to prevent overcommitment. Security: v0.2.0 eliminates RCE vulnerability from v0.1.3 (shell/JSON injection in examples), adds endpoint verification, safe jq patterns throughout.

H:4 D:3 A:3 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PERSISTENCE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV ACT_POST_PUBLIC PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

❌ Read workspace
❌ Write workspace
❌ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages✅ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

APPROVE_POST: Can post publicly
SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT medium

Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:yatta:0.2.2",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T12:21:10.063Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Yatta! - Task & Capacity Management",
    "version": "0.2.2",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Personal productivity system for task and capacity management. Create and organize tasks with rich attributes (priority, effort, complexity, tags), track time and streaks, manage capacity across projects and contexts, view Eisenhower Matrix prioritization, sync calendar subscriptions, handle delegation and follow-ups, and get AI-powered insights. Supports batch operations, multi-project workflows, and real-time capacity planning to prevent overcommitment. Security: v0.2.0 eliminates RCE vulnerability from v0.1.3 (shell/JSON injection in examples), adds endpoint verification, safe jq patterns throughout.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "127f709ca7f1d4381a76bdd3d440dc26a0c788f5d6554f9f9507a38291b2d716",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": false,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": true,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 3,
      "A": 3,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "ACT_POST_PUBLIC",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Instructs agent to clone and potentially build from source"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 5 security patterns (6 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D3: Credential access detected",
      "A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "APPROVE_POST",
        "reason": "Can post publicly"
      },
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
        "severity": "medium",
        "mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "package.json",
      "file_path": "package.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/verify-endpoint.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify-endpoint.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/yatta-safe-api.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/yatta-safe-api.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] README.md:60: git clone https://github.com/chrisagiddings/openclaw-yatta-skill.git",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/verify-endpoint.sh:54: IP=$(nslookup \"$HOST\" 2>/dev/null | grep -A1 \"Name:\" | tail -1 | awk '{print $2}",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify-endpoint.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/verify-endpoint.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify-endpoint.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/yatta-safe-api.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/yatta-safe-api.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:884: # Extract email subject and body",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}