openclaw-reflect
ยท v1.0.2
>
H:3 D:3 A:1 C:1
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
EXEC FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
โ send messagesโ post publicโ purchaseโ transfer moneyโ deployโ delete external
๐ Containment
Level: elevated
Required:
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Prompt injection patterns detected in: scripts/evaluate.js high
Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION) critical
Mitigation: Remove deceptive language. Tools must be transparent about their behavior.
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:openclaw-reflect:1.0.2",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-05T13:20:39.238Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "openclaw-reflect",
"version": "1.0.2",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": ">",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "655f7333fd0353c2ade50268b9063194ba8c2eced5476ffcd16e5b62ca85dc7b",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": true,
"writes_user_home": true,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web",
"documents"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 3,
"D": 3,
"A": 1,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
"FS_WRITE_USER",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"PI_WEB",
"PI_DOCUMENTS"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
"name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
"description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: scripts/evaluate.js"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_POISONING",
"name": "Tool Poisoning",
"description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 3 security patterns (3 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H3: Shell/code execution or persistence detected",
"D": "D3: Credential access detected",
"A": "A1: Local side effects only",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "elevated",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: scripts/evaluate.js",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION)",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Remove deceptive language. Tools must be transparent about their behavior."
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "hooks/post-tool-use.js",
"file_path": "hooks/post-tool-use.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "hooks/session-end.js",
"file_path": "hooks/session-end.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "hooks/user-prompt-submit.js",
"file_path": "hooks/user-prompt-submit.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "README.md",
"file_path": "README.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/apply.js",
"file_path": "scripts/apply.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/classify.js",
"file_path": "scripts/classify.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/evaluate.js",
"file_path": "scripts/evaluate.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/hook-observe.js",
"file_path": "scripts/hook-observe.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/hook-pipeline.js",
"file_path": "scripts/hook-pipeline.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/observe.js",
"file_path": "scripts/observe.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION [CRITICAL] README.md:7: ## What it actually does",
"file_path": "README.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:143: ",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:26: - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY # Enables Anthropic evaluator backend (claude-haiku-4-5-",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}