pensieve-algorand
ยท v2.0.0
High-performance hybrid memory for OpenClaw with strict append-only capture, budgeted daily dream cycles, and optional Algorand anchoring through encrypted notes and external signing. Use when you need durable cross-session consistency with predictable runtime and low token overhead.
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.
Mitigation: Remove dangerous system commands.
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Mitigation: Review base64 usage, especially if combined with network calls
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๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:pensieve-algorand v2:2.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-05T15:54:28.755Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "pensieve-algorand",
"version": "2.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "High-performance hybrid memory for OpenClaw with strict append-only capture, budgeted daily dream cycles, and optional Algorand anchoring through encrypted notes and external signing. Use when you need durable cross-session consistency with predictable runtime and low token overhead.",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "a173f17f3e0d77b013e0b0682231a3e36ab39551a43c58210c05656b9d2e6f52",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": false,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": false,
"reads_credential_files": false,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": true
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 0,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
"name": "Keychain Access",
"description": "Accesses system keychain in: scripts/decrypt_note_payload.py, scripts/rotate_note_key.py"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM: Dangerous system commands or Windows exploitation"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "DATA_EXFIL_BASE64_AND_NETWORK: Base64 encoding (often used before data exfiltration)"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (4 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A0: No side effects detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/decrypt_note_payload.py, scripts/rotate_note_key.py",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Remove dangerous system commands."
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_BASE64_AND_NETWORK",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Review base64 usage, especially if combined with network calls"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/algorand_anchor_tx.py",
"file_path": "scripts/algorand_anchor_tx.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/build_anchor_payload.py",
"file_path": "scripts/build_anchor_payload.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/build_unsigned_anchor_tx.py",
"file_path": "scripts/build_unsigned_anchor_tx.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/capture_event.py",
"file_path": "scripts/capture_event.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/check_algorand_funding.py",
"file_path": "scripts/check_algorand_funding.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/decrypt_note_payload.py",
"file_path": "scripts/decrypt_note_payload.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/dream_cycle_budgeted.py",
"file_path": "scripts/dream_cycle_budgeted.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/encrypt_note_payload.py",
"file_path": "scripts/encrypt_note_payload.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/fetch_anchor_note.py",
"file_path": "scripts/fetch_anchor_note.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/init_memory_layers.py",
"file_path": "scripts/init_memory_layers.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM [CRITICAL] scripts/decrypt_note_payload.py:24: reg = Path(args.keyring_dir) / 'algorand-note-key-registry.json'",
"file_path": "scripts/decrypt_note_payload.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_BASE64_AND_NETWORK [CRITICAL] scripts/encrypt_note_payload.py:17: print(base64.b64encode(out).decode('ascii'))",
"file_path": "scripts/encrypt_note_payload.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_BASE64_AND_NETWORK [CRITICAL] scripts/rotate_note_key.py:31: 'fingerprint_b64': base64.b64encode(key[:8]).decode('ascii')",
"file_path": "scripts/rotate_note_key.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}