openclaw-checkpoint

· v1.0.5

High Risk

Backup and restore OpenClaw workspace state and agents across machines using git. Enables disaster recovery by syncing SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, memory files, cron jobs, agents (~/.openclaw/agents/), and configuration to a remote repository. Use when user wants to checkpoint their OpenClaw state, restore on a new machine, migrate between computers, or protect against data loss. Provides commands checkpoint (help overview), checkpoint-setup (interactive onboarding), checkpoint-backup, checkpoint-restore (with interactive checkpoint selection or --latest for most recent), checkpoint-schedule (auto-backup), checkpoint-stop, checkpoint-status, checkpoint-init, and checkpoint-reset. Supports multi-agent backup with flags --workspace-only, --agents-only, and --agent <name>. Automatically backs up cron jobs to memory/cron-jobs-backup.json on each checkpoint-backup.

H:4 D:4 A:3 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PERSISTENCE FS_READ_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_FILES ACT_POST_PUBLIC PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

❌ Read workspace
❌ Write workspace
✅ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
✅ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages✅ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

APPROVE_POST: Can post publicly
SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Pipe-to-shell pattern detected (curl|bash) in: README.md, SKILL.md critical

Mitigation: Do not execute. Review source for malicious intent.

SSH key access patterns in: SKILL.md high

Mitigation: Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing.

Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION critical

Mitigation: Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments

Command injection risk: TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE high

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_REMOTE_STORAGE, MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Document all remote data storage. Avoid storing sensitive data externally.

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:openclaw-checkpoint:1.0.5",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T02:22:12.392Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "openclaw-checkpoint",
    "version": "1.0.5",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Backup and restore OpenClaw workspace state and agents across machines using git. Enables disaster recovery by syncing SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, memory files, cron jobs, agents (~/.openclaw/agents/), and configuration to a remote repository. Use when user wants to checkpoint their OpenClaw state, restore on a new machine, migrate between computers, or protect against data loss. Provides commands checkpoint (help overview), checkpoint-setup (interactive onboarding), checkpoint-backup, checkpoint-restore (with interactive checkpoint selection or --latest for most recent), checkpoint-schedule (auto-backup), checkpoint-stop, checkpoint-status, checkpoint-init, and checkpoint-reset. Supports multi-agent backup with flags --workspace-only, --agents-only, and --agent <name>. Automatically backs up cron jobs to memory/cron-jobs-backup.json on each checkpoint-backup.",
    "publisher": "ClawHub",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "7baba861e2ed32b89c32d64e8b5dbc156d09277ccf527992d37da294353550ac",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": true
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": true,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 3,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_DELETE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "ACT_POST_PUBLIC",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PIPE_TO_SHELL",
        "name": "Pipe to Shell",
        "description": "Downloads and executes remote code (curl|bash pattern) in: README.md, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "CRED_SSH",
        "name": "SSH Key Access",
        "description": "Accesses SSH keys in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: README.md, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "FILE_DELETE",
        "name": "File Deletion",
        "description": "Can delete files in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION: Instructs agent to install external binary or package"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE: Redirecting output to home directory dotfiles (shell config, SSH keys, etc.)"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_REMOTE_STORAGE, MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 8 security patterns (10 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "APPROVE_POST",
        "reason": "Can post publicly"
      },
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Pipe-to-shell pattern detected (curl|bash) in: README.md, SKILL.md",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Do not execute. Review source for malicious intent."
      },
      {
        "risk": "SSH key access patterns in: SKILL.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE",
        "severity": "high"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_REMOTE_STORAGE, MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Document all remote data storage. Avoid storing sensitive data externally."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] README.md:51: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] README.md:28: git clone https://github.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint.git ~/.openclaw/",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_REMOTE_STORAGE [MEDIUM] README.md:113: Your backup contains personal data:",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:48: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint/",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:31: git clone https://github.com/AnthonyFrancis/openclaw-checkpoint.git ~/.openclaw/",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:562: - Store API keys in password manager, not in backed-up files",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_REMOTE_STORAGE [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:391: - Whether synced with remote",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:629: rm -rf ~/.openclaw/workspace/agents",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE [HIGH] SKILL.md:494: 0 * * * * /Users/$(whoami)/.openclaw/workspace/skills/openclaw-checkpoint/script",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}