OpenClaw AWS Deploy

· v1.0.0

High Risk

Deploy OpenClaw securely on AWS with a single command. Creates VPC, EC2 (ARM64), Telegram channel, and configurable AI model (Bedrock, Gemini, or any provider) — SSM-only access, no SSH. Use when setting up OpenClaw on AWS, deploying a new agent instance to EC2, or tearing down an existing AWS deployment.

H:4 D:4 A:0 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED PERSISTENCE FS_READ_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: admin

Filesystem

❌ Read workspace
❌ Write workspace
✅ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Cloud credential access patterns in: README.md, scripts/deploy_minimal.sh, scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh, scripts/teardown.sh, SKILL.md high

Mitigation: Verify legitimate need for cloud credential access.

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION critical

Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_ARCHIVE_SENSITIVE_PATH high

Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

Want a deeper analysis?

This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:openclaw-aws-deploy:1.0.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T14:10:13.499Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "OpenClaw AWS Deploy",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Deploy OpenClaw securely on AWS with a single command. Creates VPC, EC2 (ARM64), Telegram channel, and configurable AI model (Bedrock, Gemini, or any provider) — SSM-only access, no SSH. Use when setting up OpenClaw on AWS, deploying a new agent instance to EC2, or tearing down an existing AWS deployment.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "4d62ecc4a2fee0e02f4cd488bf41d0c0ea526622d2df1a69dcba826189dc23f9",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 0,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "CRED_CLOUD",
        "name": "Cloud Credential Access",
        "description": "Accesses cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure) in: README.md, scripts/deploy_minimal.sh, scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh, scripts/teardown.sh, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: scripts/deploy_minimal.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: README.md, scripts/deploy_minimal.sh, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION: Access to critical system directories"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_ARCHIVE_SENSITIVE_PATH: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (15 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A0: No side effects detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Cloud credential access patterns in: README.md, scripts/deploy_minimal.sh, scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh, scripts/teardown.sh, SKILL.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Verify legitimate need for cloud credential access."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_ARCHIVE_SENSITIVE_PATH",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "references/config-templates/startup.sh",
      "file_path": "references/config-templates/startup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/deploy_minimal.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/deploy_minimal.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/preflight.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/preflight.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/smoke_test.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/smoke_test.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/teardown.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/teardown.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] README.md:127: | **SSM** | `PutParameter`, `SendCommand`, `StartSession` | Store secrets, run c",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] references/config-templates/startup.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "references/config-templates/startup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/deploy_minimal.sh:554: AZ=$(echo \"$ALL_AZS\" | awk '{print $1}')",
      "file_path": "scripts/deploy_minimal.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/deploy_minimal.sh:1013: chown -R openclaw:openclaw /home/openclaw/.openclaw",
      "file_path": "scripts/deploy_minimal.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/deploy_minimal.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/deploy_minimal.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_ARCHIVE_SENSITIVE_PATH [HIGH] scripts/deploy_minimal.sh:869: tar -xf node.tar.xz -C /usr/local --strip-components=1",
      "file_path": "scripts/deploy_minimal.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/preflight.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/preflight.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup_deployer_role.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/smoke_test.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/smoke_test.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/teardown.sh:156: result=$(aws_with_region --output text \"$@\" 2>\"$stderr_file\") || exit_code=$?",
      "file_path": "scripts/teardown.sh"
    }
  ]
}