๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ SafeAgentSkills

MyClaw Backup โ€” Powered by MyClaw.ai

ยท v1.7.0

Medium Risk

"Backup and restore all OpenClaw configuration, agent memory, skills, and workspace data. Part of the MyClaw.ai (https://myclaw.ai) open skills ecosystem โ€” the AI personal assistant platform that gives every user a full server with complete code control. Use when the user wants to create a snapshot of their OpenClaw instance, schedule periodic backups, restore from a backup, migrate to a new server, download a backup file locally, upload a backup file from another machine, or protect against data loss. Includes a built-in HTTP server for browser-based download/upload/restore without needing cloud storage. TRUST BOUNDARY: This skill archives and restores highly sensitive data including bot tokens, API keys, and channel credentials. Only install if you trust the operator. Always use --dry-run before restore. Never start the HTTP server without a --token."

H:3 D:3 A:1 C:1

โš ๏ธ Hazard Flags

EXEC PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY NET_INGRESS CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB

๐Ÿ“‹ Capabilities

Execution

  • โœ… Shell execution
  • โŒ Code execution
  • โŒ Install dependencies
  • โœ… Persistence
  • Privilege: user

Filesystem

  • โœ… Read workspace
  • โœ… Write workspace
  • โœ… Read home
  • โœ… Write home
  • โŒ Read system
  • โœ… Delete

Network

  • Egress: any
  • โœ… Ingress

Credentials

  • โœ… Environment vars
  • โœ… Credential files
  • โŒ Browser data
  • โŒ Keychain

Actions

โŒ send messagesโŒ post publicโŒ purchaseโŒ transfer moneyโŒ deployโŒ delete external

๐Ÿ”’ Containment

Level: elevated

Required:
  • SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
  • LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

โšก Risks

Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS critical

Mitigation: Remove system modification commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Want a deeper analysis?

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๐Ÿšจ Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

๐Ÿ“„ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:myclaw-backup:1.7.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T13:35:05.649Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "MyClaw Backup โ€” Powered by MyClaw.ai",
    "version": "1.7.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "\"Backup and restore all OpenClaw configuration, agent memory, skills, and workspace data. Part of the MyClaw.ai (https://myclaw.ai) open skills ecosystem โ€” the AI personal assistant platform that gives every user a full server with complete code control. Use when the user wants to create a snapshot of their OpenClaw instance, schedule periodic backups, restore from a backup, migrate to a new server, download a backup file locally, upload a backup file from another machine, or protect against data loss. Includes a built-in HTTP server for browser-based download/upload/restore without needing cloud storage. TRUST BOUNDARY: This skill archives and restores highly sensitive data including bot tokens, API keys, and channel credentials. Only install if you trust the operator. Always use --dry-run before restore. Never start the HTTP server without a --token.\"",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "8f4218906e44e5623fe2cbe283edfe2a66ac73691b7d0ed29aa2166d57237e35",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": true
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": true
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 3,
      "D": 3,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "FS_DELETE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "NET_INGRESS",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: scripts/schedule.sh, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "FILE_DELETE",
        "name": "File Deletion",
        "description": "Can delete files in: scripts/backup.sh, scripts/restore.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "NET_INGRESS",
        "name": "Network Server",
        "description": "Listens for incoming connections in: scripts/server.js"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Modifying system permissions or configuration"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 5 security patterns (19 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H3: Shell/code execution or persistence detected",
      "D": "D3: Credential access detected",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "elevated",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove system modification commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/backup.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/backup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/restore.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/restore.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/schedule.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/schedule.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/serve.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/serve.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/server.js",
      "file_path": "scripts/server.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/backup.sh:188: chmod 600 \"$ARCHIVE\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/backup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] scripts/backup.sh:185: rm -rf \"$WORK_DIR\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/backup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/backup.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/backup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/backup.sh:24: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[1;33m'; RED='\\033[0;31m'; NC='\\033[0m'",
      "file_path": "scripts/backup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] scripts/backup.sh:24: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[1;33m'; RED='\\033[0;31m'; NC='\\033[0m'",
      "file_path": "scripts/backup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/restore.sh:131: chmod 600 \"$AUTO_BACKUP\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/restore.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SECRET_PASSWORD_VAR [MEDIUM] scripts/restore.sh:174: token = '${CURRENT_GATEWAY_TOKEN}'",
      "file_path": "scripts/restore.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] scripts/restore.sh:45: trap \"rm -rf $WORK_DIR\" EXIT",
      "file_path": "scripts/restore.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/restore.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/restore.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/restore.sh:27: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[1;33m'; RED='\\033[0;31m'; CYAN='\\033[0;36m'; NC",
      "file_path": "scripts/restore.sh"
    }
  ]
}