๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ SafeAgentSkills

Mediator

ยท v1.0.0

High Risk

Intercept and filter communications from difficult contacts. Strips emotion, extracts facts, drafts neutral responses. Use when setting up communication filtering for specific contacts, configuring the mediator, or processing intercepted messages. Triggers on "mediator", "intercept messages", "filter communications", "difficult contact", or requests to handle messages from someone the user doesn't want to deal with directly.

H:4 D:4 A:1 C:1

โš ๏ธ Hazard Flags

EXEC FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER

๐Ÿ“‹ Capabilities

Execution

  • โœ… Shell execution
  • โŒ Code execution
  • โŒ Install dependencies
  • โŒ Persistence
  • Privilege: user

Filesystem

  • โœ… Read workspace
  • โœ… Write workspace
  • โŒ Read home
  • โœ… Write home
  • โŒ Read system
  • โŒ Delete

Network

  • Egress: none
  • โŒ Ingress

Credentials

  • โŒ Environment vars
  • โŒ Credential files
  • โŒ Browser data
  • โŒ Keychain

Actions

โŒ send messagesโŒ post publicโŒ purchaseโŒ transfer moneyโŒ deployโŒ delete external

๐Ÿ”’ Containment

Level: maximum

Required:
  • SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
  • LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

โšก Risks

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_OS_SYSTEM, COMMAND_INJECTION_SHELL_TRUE critical

Mitigation: Use subprocess with argument lists, not shell strings

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions

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๐Ÿšจ Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

๐Ÿ“„ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:mediator:1.0.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T03:35:42.707Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Mediator",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Intercept and filter communications from difficult contacts. Strips emotion, extracts facts, drafts neutral responses. Use when setting up communication filtering for specific contacts, configuring the mediator, or processing intercepted messages. Triggers on \"mediator\", \"intercept messages\", \"filter communications\", \"difficult contact\", or requests to handle messages from someone the user doesn't want to deal with directly.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "75efbbccde00383d4c17d744411cb38c6ec1c71d02170b5b8b7a7dcb761ebdcf",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": false,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "none",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Access to critical system directories"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_OS_SYSTEM, COMMAND_INJECTION_SHELL_TRUE: Shell command execution with string formatting (potential injection)"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (9 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_OS_SYSTEM, COMMAND_INJECTION_SHELL_TRUE",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Use subprocess with argument lists, not shell strings"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/config-helper.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/config-helper.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/mediator.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/mediator.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/process-email.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/process-email.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/process-imessage.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/process-imessage.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/summarize.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/summarize.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_OS_SYSTEM [CRITICAL] scripts/config-helper.py:13: os.system(f\"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/config-helper.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_SHELL_TRUE [HIGH] scripts/config-helper.py:13: os.system(f\"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/config-helper.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/mediator.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/mediator.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_OS_SYSTEM [CRITICAL] scripts/process-email.py:17: os.system(f\"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/process-email.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_SHELL_TRUE [HIGH] scripts/process-email.py:17: os.system(f\"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/process-email.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_OS_SYSTEM [CRITICAL] scripts/process-imessage.py:17: os.system(f\"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/process-imessage.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_SHELL_TRUE [HIGH] scripts/process-imessage.py:17: os.system(f\"{sys.executable} -m pip install -q pyyaml\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/process-imessage.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:79: 1. Gmail Pub/Sub notification arrives (real-time)",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}