Invoice Collector

· v1.2.0

High Risk

Collect invoices/receipts from Gmail and send a summary email with attachments. Automatically downloads PDF attachments or takes screenshots of emails without PDFs. Use when user wants to gather invoices, receipts, or billing emails and forward them to another address. Requires gogcli (gog) to be configured with Gmail access.

H:4 D:4 A:1 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_KEYCHAIN PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: admin

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
✅ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
✅ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Keychain/credential store access in: SKILL.md high

Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, MCP_SYS_PERMISSION_MANIPULATION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL critical

Mitigation: Remove destructive file operations.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:invoice-collector:1.2.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T14:19:38.974Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Invoice Collector",
    "version": "1.2.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Collect invoices/receipts from Gmail and send a summary email with attachments. Automatically downloads PDF attachments or takes screenshots of emails without PDFs. Use when user wants to gather invoices, receipts, or billing emails and forward them to another address. Requires gogcli (gog) to be configured with Gmail access.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "d9f742d8ea33be4792c1928036f4c1494110c3f28c2f05577f780482d121ea1d",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": true
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": true
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "FS_DELETE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
        "name": "Keychain Access",
        "description": "Accesses system keychain in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: SKILL.md, scripts/collect_invoices.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "FILE_DELETE",
        "name": "File Deletion",
        "description": "Can delete files in: scripts/collect_invoices.sh, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, MCP_SYS_PERMISSION_MANIPULATION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL: File destruction or wiping commands"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (9 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: SKILL.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, MCP_SYS_PERMISSION_MANIPULATION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove destructive file operations."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/collect_invoices.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/collect_invoices.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] scripts/collect_invoices.sh:155: rm -rf \"$INVOICE_DIR\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/collect_invoices.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_PERMISSION_MANIPULATION [CRITICAL] scripts/collect_invoices.sh:109: args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox']",
      "file_path": "scripts/collect_invoices.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/collect_invoices.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/collect_invoices.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:48: **macOS users**: Use `brew install steipete/tap/gogcli` which handles verificati",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:4: description: Collect invoices/receipts from Gmail and send a summary email with ",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:233: - \"AnthropicとVercelとAWSの請求書を集めて\"",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:189: Parse email for sender, date, amount:",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:243: - **Cleanup**: `rm -rf /tmp/invoices` after sending",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}