Invoice Chaser

· v1.1.0

High Risk

Automated invoice follow-up sequences that escalate from friendly to firm. Track unpaid invoices, send timed reminder emails with escalating tone, log payment interactions, and generate AR aging reports. Your agent handles the awkward conversations so you don't have to — preserving cash flow and client relationships while you focus on actual work. Configure invoice tracking, email templates per stage (friendly → firm → final notice), timing rules, and let your agent chase payments 24/7. Use when adding invoices, running payment chases, checking status, or generating accounts receivable reports.

H:4 D:4 A:0 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC FS_READ_USER CREDS_FILES

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

❌ Read workspace
❌ Write workspace
✅ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: none
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE high

Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:invoice-chaser:1.1.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T03:15:19.016Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Invoice Chaser",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Automated invoice follow-up sequences that escalate from friendly to firm. Track unpaid invoices, send timed reminder emails with escalating tone, log payment interactions, and generate AR aging reports. Your agent handles the awkward conversations so you don't have to — preserving cash flow and client relationships while you focus on actual work. Configure invoice tracking, email templates per stage (friendly → firm → final notice), timing rules, and let your agent chase payments 24/7. Use when adding invoices, running payment chases, checking status, or generating accounts receivable reports.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "4ff935d0565a76e1f827175e9262f522bdecfda52a8f9c05e293b607310a2740",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "none",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 0,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "CREDS_FILES"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Access to critical system directories"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (6 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A0: No side effects detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/add-invoice.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/add-invoice.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/setup.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/add-invoice.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/add-invoice.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/setup.sh:7: SKILL_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")/..\" && pwd)\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/setup.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:28: 3. Ensure `gog` skill is installed (for Gmail sending)",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE [HIGH] SKILL.md:188: 0 9 * * * cd ~/clawd/skills/invoice-chaser && scripts/chase.sh >> ~/.config/invo",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}