Flowclaw

· v1.1.1

High Risk

"Unkillable LLM load balancer for OpenClaw. Monitors usage across Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, and Ollama. Scores accounts by urgency, rotates automatically, and fails over to local models. Your agent never gets stuck."

H:4 D:4 A:2 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_KEYCHAIN PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
✅ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/save-account.sh high

Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.

Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION critical

Mitigation: Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments

Command injection risk: TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT high

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:FlowClaw:1.1.1",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T13:53:01.355Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Flowclaw",
    "version": "1.1.1",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "\"Unkillable LLM load balancer for OpenClaw. Monitors usage across Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, and Ollama. Scores accounts by urgency, rotates automatically, and fails over to local models. Your agent never gets stuck.\"",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "81fbb84131e094a50d94e60ac4115bbdf9cbb9b0cf5735751279d0c6c1186126",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": true
    },
    "services": [
      {
        "service": "code_hosting",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 2,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
        "name": "Keychain Access",
        "description": "Accesses system keychain in: scripts/save-account.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: README.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION: Instructs agent to install external binary or package"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: Redirecting output to home directory dotfiles (shell config, SSH keys, etc.)"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 5 security patterns (11 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A2: Service integrations detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/save-account.sh",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
        "severity": "high"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/flowclaw.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/flowclaw.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/provider-usage.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/provider-usage.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/save-account.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/save-account.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/scoring-engine.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/scoring-engine.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] README.md:366: brew install --cask steipete/tap/codexbar         # Required for usage metrics",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] README.md:338: git clone https://github.com/windseeker1111/flowclaw.git ~/clawd/skills/flowclaw",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE [HIGH] README.md:345: echo 'alias flowclaw=\"bash ~/clawd/skills/flowclaw/scripts/flowclaw.sh\"' >> ~/.z",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/flowclaw.sh:8: SCRIPT_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\" && pwd)\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/flowclaw.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/flowclaw.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/flowclaw.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/provider-usage.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/provider-usage.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/save-account.sh:118: chmod 600 \"$ACCT_FILE\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/save-account.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/save-account.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/save-account.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:67: brew install --cask steipete/tap/codexbar   # Required for usage metrics",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}