ez-google

· v1.0.2

High Risk

Use when asked to send email, check inbox, read emails, check calendar, schedule meetings, create events, search Google Drive, create Google Docs, read or write spreadsheets, find contacts, or any task involving Gmail, Google Calendar, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, or Contacts. Agent-friendly with hosted OAuth - no API keys needed.

H:4 D:4 A:1 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

❌ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
✅ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP high

Mitigation: Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops

Command injection risk: MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS high

Mitigation: Remove embedded script tags and encoded payloads.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION high

Mitigation: Minimize access to environment variables

Want a deeper analysis?

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:ez-google:1.0.2",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T01:52:52.546Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "ez-google",
    "version": "1.0.2",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Use when asked to send email, check inbox, read emails, check calendar, schedule meetings, create events, search Google Drive, create Google Docs, read or write spreadsheets, find contacts, or any task involving Gmail, Google Calendar, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, or Contacts. Agent-friendly with hosted OAuth - no API keys needed.",
    "publisher": "ClawHub",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "d5b3debfa9cb8d9eed762093cb0f39e7715aca6cae7ebf95d14ccddba6147f1f",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": false,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": true
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_DELETE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "FILE_DELETE",
        "name": "File Deletion",
        "description": "Can delete files in: scripts/auth.py"
      },
      {
        "code": "RESOURCE_ABUSE",
        "name": "Resource Abuse Risk",
        "description": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP detected: Infinite loop without clear exit condition"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS: Script tags, VBScript, or encoded script data URIs"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION: Reading environment variables that may contain secrets"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 6 security patterns (7 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove embedded script tags and encoded payloads."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Minimize access to environment variables"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/auth.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/auth.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/chat.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/chat.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/docs.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/docs.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/drive.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/drive.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/gcal.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/gcal.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/gmail.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/gmail.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/people.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/people.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/sheets.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/sheets.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/slides.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/slides.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] scripts/auth.py:62: client_secret = os.environ.get(\"GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/auth.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP [HIGH] scripts/gmail.py:35: while True:",
      "file_path": "scripts/gmail.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:3: description: Use when asked to send email, check inbox, read emails, check calen",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:29: gmail.py search \"query\"              # Search emails",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION [HIGH] SKILL.md:112: chat.py send SPACE_ID \"text\"         # Send message",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS [HIGH] SKILL.md:11: **Run all commands with:** `uv run scripts/<script>.py <command> [args]`",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}