DeepRead Agent Self Sign Up
ยท v2.0.4
Authenticate AI agents with the DeepRead OCR API using OAuth device flow. The agent displays a code, the user approves it in their browser, and the agent receives a DEEPREAD_API_KEY stored as an environment variable.
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.
Mitigation: Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Mitigation: Remove SQL exploitation patterns.
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Mitigation: Ensure network access is necessary and documented
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๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:deepread-agent-setup:2.0.4",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-05T12:55:57.341Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "DeepRead Agent Self Sign Up",
"version": "2.0.4",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "Authenticate AI agents with the DeepRead OCR API using OAuth device flow. The agent displays a code, the user approves it in their browser, and the agent receives a DEEPREAD_API_KEY stored as an environment variable.",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "e9e3d8940c601ab6a4ae63177bca1602f861e24a2152a54109058635cc0cc7ec",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": true
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": false,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": true
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 0,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"PERSISTENCE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
"name": "Keychain Access",
"description": "Accesses system keychain in: device_flow.py, device_flow.sh, SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "PERSISTENCE",
"name": "Persistence Mechanism",
"description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: device_flow.py, device_flow.sh, SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "RESOURCE_ABUSE",
"name": "Resource Abuse Risk",
"description": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP detected: Infinite loop without clear exit condition"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "MCP_SQL_BLIND: Blind SQL injection, system table access, or stored procedure abuse"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD: HTTP client library imports that enable external communication"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (6 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A0: No side effects detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: device_flow.py, device_flow.sh, SKILL.md",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
},
{
"risk": "Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops"
},
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove SQL exploitation patterns."
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Ensure network access is necessary and documented"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "device_flow.py",
"file_path": "device_flow.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "device_flow.sh",
"file_path": "device_flow.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "package.json",
"file_path": "package.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] device_flow.py:16: from urllib.request import Request, urlopen",
"file_path": "device_flow.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP [HIGH] device_flow.py:48: while True:",
"file_path": "device_flow.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] device_flow.py:66: time.sleep(interval)",
"file_path": "device_flow.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] device_flow.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "device_flow.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD [HIGH] SKILL.md:22: 1. Agent calls `POST https://api.deepread.tech/v1/agent/device/code` to get a `d",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}