Clawd Zero Trust

· v1.3.1

High Risk

"Zero Trust security hardening for OpenClaw deployments. Use when asked to audit, harden, or apply Zero Trust architecture to an OpenClaw instance — including NHI identity scoping, Principle of Least Privilege (PLP), Plan-First protocol, DNS-based egress filtering, plugin allowlisting, and SSH/network lockdown. Also triggers on security audit requests, vulnerability analysis, SecureClaw installation, firewall hardening, and post-deployment security reviews."

H:4 D:2 A:2 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_WRITE_SYSTEM NET_EGRESS_ANY PI_WEB

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: admin

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
❌ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL critical

Mitigation: Remove system modification commands

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, MCP_SQL_BLIND high

Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:clawd-zero-trust:1.3.1",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T13:06:45.335Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Clawd Zero Trust",
    "version": "1.3.1",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "\"Zero Trust security hardening for OpenClaw deployments. Use when asked to audit, harden, or apply Zero Trust architecture to an OpenClaw instance — including NHI identity scoping, Principle of Least Privilege (PLP), Plan-First protocol, DNS-based egress filtering, plugin allowlisting, and SSH/network lockdown. Also triggers on security audit requests, vulnerability analysis, SecureClaw installation, firewall hardening, and post-deployment security reviews.\"",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "8640f0d8f50ec3344a78e99b5d36d7b6a6ad13effdaea94c0a5a47b35801c707",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": false,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": true,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [
      {
        "service": "email",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      },
      {
        "service": "messaging",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      },
      {
        "service": "code_hosting",
        "operations": [
          "read",
          "write"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 2,
      "A": 2,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_SYSTEM",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "PI_WEB"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: scripts/audit.sh, scripts/egress-filter.sh, scripts/harden.sh, scripts/plp-config.sh, scripts/release-gate.sh, scripts/whitelist.sh, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL: Modifying system permissions or configuration"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, MCP_SQL_BLIND: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (29 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D2: Network + file access",
      "A": "A2: Service integrations detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove system modification commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, MCP_SQL_BLIND",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/audit.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/audit.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/egress-filter.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/harden.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/harden.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/package_skill.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/package_skill.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/plp-config.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/plp-config.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/plugin-integrity.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/plugin-integrity.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/quick_validate.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/quick_validate.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/release-gate.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/release-gate.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/whitelist.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/whitelist.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/audit.sh:23: chmod 600 \"$LOG_FILE\" \"$FP_LOG_FILE\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/audit.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/audit.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/audit.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/egress-filter.sh:24: #         [SCAN-1] Replace eval \"$c\" with direct \"$@\" execution — no dynamic",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/egress-filter.sh:181: chmod 600 \"$LOG_FILE\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/egress-filter.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/egress-filter.sh:87: RED='\\033[0;31m'; GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[1;33m'; CYAN='\\033[0;36m'; BO",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/egress-filter.sh:8: # v1.0.3: Two blocking fixes from dual-model audit (GPT-5.3 + Sonnet 4.6):",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] scripts/egress-filter.sh:87: RED='\\033[0;31m'; GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[1;33m'; CYAN='\\033[0;36m'; BO",
      "file_path": "scripts/egress-filter.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/harden.sh:16: SCRIPT_PATH=\"$(readlink -f \"$0\")\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/harden.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/harden.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/harden.sh"
    }
  ]
}