Clack

· v1.5.3

High Risk

Deploy and manage Clack, a voice relay server for OpenClaw. Bridges voice input (WebSocket) through STT → OpenClaw agent → TTS, enabling real-time voice conversations with your agent. Supports ElevenLabs, OpenAI, and Deepgram for STT/TTS. Per-session provider selection — users can independently choose STT and TTS providers (including on-device) from the app settings. Encrypted connections via Domain (SSL) or Tailscale. Supports local speech mode where STT/TTS run on-device and only LLM calls go through the server. Use when a user wants to set up voice chat, voice relay, voice interface, Clack, or talk to their agent by voice.

H:4 D:4 A:1 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_WRITE_SYSTEM FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY NET_INGRESS CREDS_ENV CREDS_KEYCHAIN PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: admin

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
✅ Delete

Network

Egress: any
✅ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
✅ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/setup.sh high

Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.

Prompt injection patterns detected in: server.py high

Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.

Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP high

Mitigation: Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops

Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION critical

Mitigation: Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos

Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_INSECURE_TLS high

Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS medium

Mitigation: Ensure network access is necessary and documented

Want a deeper analysis?

This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:clack:1.5.3",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T16:07:25.477Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Clack",
    "version": "1.5.3",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Deploy and manage Clack, a voice relay server for OpenClaw. Bridges voice input (WebSocket) through STT → OpenClaw agent → TTS, enabling real-time voice conversations with your agent. Supports ElevenLabs, OpenAI, and Deepgram for STT/TTS. Per-session provider selection — users can independently choose STT and TTS providers (including on-device) from the app settings. Encrypted connections via Domain (SSL) or Tailscale. Supports local speech mode where STT/TTS run on-device and only LLM calls go through the server. Use when a user wants to set up voice chat, voice relay, voice interface, Clack, or talk to their agent by voice.",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "b3e6409177a800fbd6d8e77dedb6199daf7ddd44463c4109dfc42a1b9316be0a",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": true,
      "can_delete": true
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": true
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": true
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web",
      "documents"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_SYSTEM",
      "FS_DELETE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "NET_INGRESS",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
      "PI_WEB",
      "PI_DOCUMENTS"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
        "name": "Keychain Access",
        "description": "Accesses system keychain in: scripts/setup.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
        "name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
        "description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: server.py"
      },
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: scripts/pair.sh, scripts/setup.sh, scripts/uninstall.sh"
      },
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: README.md, scripts/pair.sh, scripts/setup.sh, SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "FILE_DELETE",
        "name": "File Deletion",
        "description": "Can delete files in: scripts/server.py, scripts/uninstall.sh, server.py"
      },
      {
        "code": "NET_INGRESS",
        "name": "Network Server",
        "description": "Listens for incoming connections in: scripts/server.py, scripts/setup.sh, server.py"
      },
      {
        "code": "RESOURCE_ABUSE",
        "name": "Resource Abuse Risk",
        "description": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP detected: Infinite loop without clear exit condition"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION: Instructs agent to clone and potentially build from source"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_INSECURE_TLS: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS: HTTP client library imports that enable external communication"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 11 security patterns (18 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/setup.sh",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: server.py",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_INSECURE_TLS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS",
        "severity": "medium",
        "mitigation": "Ensure network access is necessary and documented"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/clack.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/clack.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/pair.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/pair.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/server.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/server.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/setup.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/uninstall.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/uninstall.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "server.py",
      "file_path": "server.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] README.md:45: git clone https://github.com/fbn3799/clack-skill.git ~/.openclaw/skills/clack",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/clack.sh:5: SKILL_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$(readlink -f \"$0\")\")/..\" 2>/dev/null && pwd)\" || SK",
      "file_path": "scripts/clack.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/clack.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/clack.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/pair.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/pair.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/server.py:38: import aiohttp",
      "file_path": "scripts/server.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] scripts/server.py:357: key = os.getenv(\"ELEVENLABS_API_KEY\", \"\")",
      "file_path": "scripts/server.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP [HIGH] scripts/server.py:810: while True:",
      "file_path": "scripts/server.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/setup.sh:23: SCRIPT_DIR=\"$(cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\" && pwd)\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/setup.sh:359: chmod 600 \"$CONFIG_FILE\"",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/setup.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
    }
  ]
}