Browser Automation Ultra
ยท v1.0.0
"Zero-token browser automation via Playwright scripts with CDP lock management and human-like interaction. Use when: (1) automating any browser-based workflow (publish, login, scrape, fill forms), (2) reducing token cost by converting browser-tool explorations into replayable scripts, (3) avoiding CDP port conflicts between OpenClaw browser and Playwright, (4) needing anti-detection/human-like mouse/keyboard behavior for platforms with bot detection. NOT for: simple URL fetches (use web_fetch instead), tasks that don't need a real browser session."
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions
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๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:browser-automation-ultra:1.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-05T15:49:39.754Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "Browser Automation Ultra",
"version": "1.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "\"Zero-token browser automation via Playwright scripts with CDP lock management and human-like interaction. Use when: (1) automating any browser-based workflow (publish, login, scrape, fill forms), (2) reducing token cost by converting browser-tool explorations into replayable scripts, (3) avoiding CDP port conflicts between OpenClaw browser and Playwright, (4) needing anti-detection/human-like mouse/keyboard behavior for platforms with bot detection. NOT for: simple URL fetches (use web_fetch instead), tasks that don't need a real browser session.\"",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "d7fc0656ee30d858afbba7fbdca14d5e1ed352a098fca5c19fb72b6cde4524dc",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": false,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": true,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 0,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"FS_READ_USER",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"CREDS_BROWSER",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "CRED_BROWSER",
"name": "Browser Profile Access",
"description": "Accesses browser cookies/profiles in: scripts/browser-lock.sh"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 5 security patterns (7 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A0: No side effects detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/browser-lock.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/browser-lock.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/publish-behance.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/publish-behance.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/publish-deviantart.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/publish-deviantart.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/publish-pinterest.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/publish-pinterest.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/publish-xiaohongshu.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/publish-xiaohongshu.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/read-proton-latest.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/read-proton-latest.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/read-xhs-comments.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/read-xhs-comments.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/examples/reply-xhs-comment.js",
"file_path": "scripts/examples/reply-xhs-comment.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/playwright-template.js",
"file_path": "scripts/playwright-template.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/utils/human-like.js",
"file_path": "scripts/utils/human-like.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/browser-lock.sh:75: shell_pid=$(echo \"$info\" | awk '{print $1}')",
"file_path": "scripts/browser-lock.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/browser-lock.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "scripts/browser-lock.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS [HIGH] scripts/browser-lock.sh:7: # browser-lock.sh run [--timeout S] <script> [args...] โ acquire โ run script",
"file_path": "scripts/browser-lock.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:15: npm install -g playwright",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:156: | `read-proton-latest.js` | Proton Mail | Read inbox, output JSON list of emails",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS [HIGH] SKILL.md:103: ./scripts/browser-lock.sh run <script.js> [args] # acquire โ run โ release (3",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}