AgentCloak - Email Proxy that filters PII, 2FA, and password resets
ยท v1.0.0
"Secure email proxy for AI agents. Search, read, and draft emails via MCP with server-side credential isolation, PII redaction, prompt injection detection, and content filtering. Unlike raw Gmail/IMAP skills, your agent never sees passwords or unfiltered content. Self-host or use the hosted version."
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Mitigation: Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.
Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions
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๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:agentcloak:1.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-05T14:29:17.497Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "AgentCloak - Email Proxy that filters PII, 2FA, and password resets",
"version": "1.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "\"Secure email proxy for AI agents. Search, read, and draft emails via MCP with server-side credential isolation, PII redaction, prompt injection detection, and content filtering. Unlike raw Gmail/IMAP skills, your agent never sees passwords or unfiltered content. Self-host or use the hosted version.\"",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "17fb2453b45486050aaa6803438d86203262d25b38edbaffe60bd89b0323fca0",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": false,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": false,
"reads_user_home": false,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": false,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 3,
"D": 4,
"A": 0,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD: Instructs agent to clone and potentially build from source"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_POISONING",
"name": "Tool Poisoning",
"description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA, MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (5 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H3: Shell/code execution or persistence detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A0: No side effects detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD",
"severity": "medium",
"mitigation": "Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA, MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION)",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:52: git clone https://github.com/ryanfren/AgentCloak.git",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:3: description: \"Secure email proxy for AI agents. Search, read, and draft emails v",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:74: | `search_emails` | Search emails with Gmail-style queries | `query`, `max_resul",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_DECEPTION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:139: | Hosted version | Your email credentials are stored server-side (encrypted). Em",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}