Agent Security Ops
ยท v1.2.1
"Stop leaking secrets. Pre-commit hooks + 10-point scans + cron monitoring. Agent-ops security in one command. By The Agent Wire (theagentwire.ai)"
H:4 D:4 A:2 C:1
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
EXEC PRIVILEGED PERSISTENCE FS_READ_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES PI_WEB
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: admin
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
โ send messagesโ post publicโ purchaseโ transfer moneyโ deployโ delete external
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
Required:
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
SSH key access patterns in: scripts/scan.sh, scripts/setup.sh, SKILL.md high
Mitigation: Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing.
Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION critical
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT medium
Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:agent-security-ops:1.2.1",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-05T13:52:22.204Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "Agent Security Ops",
"version": "1.2.1",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "\"Stop leaking secrets. Pre-commit hooks + 10-point scans + cron monitoring. Agent-ops security in one command. By The Agent Wire (theagentwire.ai)\"",
"publisher": "unknown",
"source": {
"channel": "local"
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "9e99194c2d8426497906b4dfcbda1b5523e76e3a2b546b9ec7d0a7df6c3d3cc4",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "admin",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": true
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": false,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": true
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [
{
"service": "email",
"operations": [
"read",
"write"
]
},
{
"service": "messaging",
"operations": [
"read",
"write"
]
}
],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 2,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"PRIVILEGED",
"PERSISTENCE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_DELETE",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "CRED_SSH",
"name": "SSH Key Access",
"description": "Accesses SSH keys in: scripts/scan.sh, scripts/setup.sh, SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "PERSISTENCE",
"name": "Persistence Mechanism",
"description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: scripts/scan.sh"
},
{
"code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
"name": "Privilege Escalation",
"description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: scripts/scan.sh, SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "FILE_DELETE",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Can delete files in: scripts/monitor.sh, scripts/setup.sh"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (16 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A2: Service integrations detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "SSH key access patterns in: scripts/scan.sh, scripts/setup.sh, SKILL.md",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing."
},
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
"severity": "medium",
"mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/monitor.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/monitor.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/scan.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/scan.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/setup.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/monitor.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
"file_path": "scripts/monitor.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/monitor.sh:13: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[0;33m'; BLUE='\\033[0;34m'; NC='\\033[0m'; BOLD='",
"file_path": "scripts/monitor.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] scripts/monitor.sh:13: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[0;33m'; BLUE='\\033[0;34m'; NC='\\033[0m'; BOLD='",
"file_path": "scripts/monitor.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/scan.sh:300: port_list=$(echo \"$open_ports_out\" | awk '{print $9}' | grep -oE '[0-9]+$' | sor",
"file_path": "scripts/scan.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/scan.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
"file_path": "scripts/scan.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/scan.sh:26: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[0;33m'; RED='\\033[0;31m'; BLUE='\\033[0;34m'; NC",
"file_path": "scripts/scan.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] scripts/scan.sh:26: GREEN='\\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\\033[0;33m'; RED='\\033[0;31m'; BLUE='\\033[0;34m'; NC",
"file_path": "scripts/scan.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/setup.sh:117: EXPECTED_HASH=$(grep \"$TARBALL\" \"$TMP/checksums.txt\" | awk '{print $1}')",
"file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] scripts/setup.sh:293: chmod 700 \"$HOME/.ssh\"",
"file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] scripts/setup.sh:104: rm -rf \"$TMP\"",
"file_path": "scripts/setup.sh"
}
]
}