Agent Orchestrator

· v1.0.2

High Risk

Multi-agent orchestration with 5 proven patterns - Work Crew, Supervisor, Pipeline, Council, and Auto-Routing

H:4 D:3 A:1 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: user

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
❌ Read home
❌ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Code obfuscation detected in: route.py medium

Mitigation: Deobfuscate and review code before use.

Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND high

Mitigation: Remove SQL exploitation patterns.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:agent-orchestrator:1.0.2",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T13:34:18.257Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Agent Orchestrator",
    "version": "1.0.2",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Multi-agent orchestration with 5 proven patterns - Work Crew, Supervisor, Pipeline, Council, and Auto-Routing",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "7f5ac63e41a0594935ba899de4e75eeb92ea4cb4f6207c8bbd719e79934506c6",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": false,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web",
      "documents"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 3,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "PI_WEB",
      "PI_DOCUMENTS"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "OBFUSCATED_CODE",
        "name": "Obfuscated Code",
        "description": "Contains obfuscated code patterns in: route.py"
      },
      {
        "code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
        "name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
        "description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: utils.py"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "MCP_SQL_BLIND: Blind SQL injection, system table access, or stored procedure abuse"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (5 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D3: Credential access detected",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Code obfuscation detected in: route.py",
        "severity": "medium",
        "mitigation": "Deobfuscate and review code before use."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove SQL exploitation patterns."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "__init__.py",
      "file_path": "__init__.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "__main__.py",
      "file_path": "__main__.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "council.py",
      "file_path": "council.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "crew.py",
      "file_path": "crew.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "examples/README.md",
      "file_path": "examples/README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "pipeline.py",
      "file_path": "pipeline.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "route.py",
      "file_path": "route.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "supervise.py",
      "file_path": "supervise.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] pipeline.py:558: time.sleep(1)  # Small delay between stages",
      "file_path": "pipeline.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:168: Multi-agent patterns use approximately 15x more tokens than single-agent interac",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] supervise.py:559: time.sleep(1)",
      "file_path": "supervise.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] utils.py:354: time.sleep(poll_interval)",
      "file_path": "utils.py"
    }
  ]
}