Agentic Mode Upgrades

· v2.3.1

High Risk

Enhanced agentic loop infrastructure for OpenClaw

H:4 D:4 A:3 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES CREDS_BROWSER ACT_POST_PUBLIC PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
❌ Persistence
Privilege: admin

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
✅ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

✅ Environment vars
✅ Credential files
✅ Browser data
❌ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages✅ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

APPROVE_POST: Can post publicly
SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Prompt injection patterns detected in: src/dist/llm/caller.js, src/llm/caller.ts high

Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.

Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION critical

Mitigation: Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos

Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND high

Mitigation: Remove SQL exploitation patterns.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Want a deeper analysis?

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:@openclaw/enhanced-loop:2.3.1",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T12:41:30.067Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Agentic Mode Upgrades",
    "version": "2.3.1",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Enhanced agentic loop infrastructure for OpenClaw",
    "publisher": "unknown",
    "source": {
      "channel": "local"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "d129d3d492d0f95a94a80651dbb8208fc0a7f67a21d4f218729a9c0e3b245c86",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": true
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": true,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": true,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": true,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web",
      "documents"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 3,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "FS_DELETE",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_ENV",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "CREDS_BROWSER",
      "ACT_POST_PUBLIC",
      "PI_WEB",
      "PI_DOCUMENTS"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
        "name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
        "description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: src/dist/llm/caller.js, src/llm/caller.ts"
      },
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: SKILL.md, src/dist/execution/retry-engine.js, src/execution/retry-engine.ts"
      },
      {
        "code": "FILE_DELETE",
        "name": "File Deletion",
        "description": "Can delete files in: SKILL.md, src/dist/state/checkpoint.js, src/dist/state/persistence.js, src/state/checkpoint.ts, src/state/persistence.ts"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION: Instructs agent to clone and potentially build from source"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "MCP_SQL_BLIND: Blind SQL injection, system table access, or stored procedure abuse"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 6 security patterns (9 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "APPROVE_POST",
        "reason": "Can post publicly"
      },
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: src/dist/llm/caller.js, src/llm/caller.ts",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Use pre-built packages or vendored dependencies instead of cloning repos"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove SQL exploitation patterns."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/analyze-task-graph.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/analyze-task-graph.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/validate-plan.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/validate-plan.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/verify.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "src/agent-paths.ts",
      "file_path": "src/agent-paths.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "src/context/manager.ts",
      "file_path": "src/context/manager.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "src/context/summarizer.ts",
      "file_path": "src/context/summarizer.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "src/dist/agent-paths.d.ts",
      "file_path": "src/dist/agent-paths.d.ts"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "src/dist/agent-paths.js",
      "file_path": "src/dist/agent-paths.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] README.md:50: git clone https://github.com/openclaw/skill-agentic-loop-upgrade agentic-loop-up",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/verify.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] scripts/verify.sh:14: green()  { echo -e \"\\033[0;32m✅ $*\\033[0m\"; }",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] scripts/verify.sh:14: green()  { echo -e \"\\033[0;32m✅ $*\\033[0m\"; }",
      "file_path": "scripts/verify.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:293: - **OAuth setup tokens supported natively.** The LLM caller detects `sk-ant-oat*",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:86: // Notify user: \"⚠️ Approve rm -rf? Auto-proceeding in 15s...\"",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] src/dist/execution/error-recovery.js:347: await sleep(diagnosis.strategy.delay);",
      "file_path": "src/dist/execution/error-recovery.js"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] src/execution/error-recovery.ts:410: await sleep(diagnosis.strategy.delay);",
      "file_path": "src/execution/error-recovery.ts"
    }
  ]
}