Imap Idle Review

⬇ 1,242 downloads · ⭐ 2

High Risk

Event-driven email monitoring using IMAP IDLE protocol. Replaces polling with instant push notifications via OpenClaw webhooks. Use when setting up email monitoring, replacing hourly email checks, or implementing event-driven email processing. Monitors multiple IMAP accounts, triggers webhooks on new mail, zero tokens while waiting.

H:4 D:4 A:1 C:1

⚠️ Hazard Flags

EXEC PRIVILEGED PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_WRITE_SYSTEM NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_KEYCHAIN PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS

📋 Capabilities

Execution

✅ Shell execution
❌ Code execution
❌ Install dependencies
✅ Persistence
Privilege: admin

Filesystem

✅ Read workspace
✅ Write workspace
✅ Read home
✅ Write home
❌ Read system
❌ Delete

Network

Egress: any
❌ Ingress

Credentials

❌ Environment vars
❌ Credential files
❌ Browser data
✅ Keychain

Actions

❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external

🔒 Containment

Level: maximum

Required:

SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability

Recommended:

LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

⚡ Risks

Keychain/credential store access in: SKILL.md, scripts/setup.py, scripts/listener.py, scripts/listener_old.py, README.md high

Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.

Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP high

Mitigation: Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops

Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION critical

Mitigation: Remove system modification commands

Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND high

Mitigation: Remove SQL exploitation patterns.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high

Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.

Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD, DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS high

Mitigation: Document all external data transfers. Remove suspicious upload references.

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🚨 Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand

{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:imap-idle:1.4.0",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T11:44:32.544Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "Imap Idle Review",
    "version": "1.4.0",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "Event-driven email monitoring using IMAP IDLE protocol. Replaces polling with instant push notifications via OpenClaw webhooks. Use when setting up email monitoring, replacing hourly email checks, or implementing event-driven email processing. Monitors multiple IMAP accounts, triggers webhooks on new mail, zero tokens while waiting.",
    "publisher": "ClawHub",
    "source": {
      "channel": "clawhub",
      "slug": "imap-idle",
      "owner": "topitip",
      "downloads": 1242,
      "stars": 2
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "1292035d93af8838b389c6dea9a64f39ba5c5b2777158e4713f17db0e2dc46ee",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "admin",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": true
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": true,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": true,
      "writes_user_home": true,
      "writes_system": true,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": false,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": true
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web",
      "documents"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 4,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 1,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "PRIVILEGED",
      "PERSISTENCE",
      "FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
      "FS_WRITE_USER",
      "FS_WRITE_SYSTEM",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
      "PI_WEB",
      "PI_DOCUMENTS"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
        "name": "Keychain Access",
        "description": "Accesses system keychain in: SKILL.md, scripts/setup.py, scripts/listener.py, scripts/listener_old.py, README.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
        "name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
        "description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: README.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PERSISTENCE",
        "name": "Persistence Mechanism",
        "description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
        "name": "Privilege Escalation",
        "description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "RESOURCE_ABUSE",
        "name": "Resource Abuse Risk",
        "description": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP detected: Infinite loop without clear exit condition"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION: Modifying system permissions or configuration"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
        "name": "Command Injection Risk",
        "description": "MCP_SQL_BLIND: Blind SQL injection, system table access, or stored procedure abuse"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_POISONING",
        "name": "Tool Poisoning",
        "description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD, DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS: Description mentions uploading data to external servers"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 10 security patterns (11 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A1: Local side effects only",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: SKILL.md, scripts/setup.py, scripts/listener.py, scripts/listener_old.py, README.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove system modification commands"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove SQL exploitation patterns."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD, DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Document all external data transfers. Remove suspicious upload references."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SKILL.md",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/setup.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/setup.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/listener.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/listener_old.py",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener_old.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "README.md",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:136: **🔐 Recommended:** Store passwords in system keychain instead of config file.",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_EXFIL_EXTERNAL_UPLOAD [HIGH] SKILL.md:256: curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18789/hooks/wake \\",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/listener.py:35: import urllib.request",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP [HIGH] scripts/listener.py:302: while True:",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/listener.py:382: time.sleep(backoff)",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/listener_old.py:35: import urllib.request",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener_old.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP [HIGH] scripts/listener_old.py:299: while True:",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener_old.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/listener_old.py:379: time.sleep(backoff)",
      "file_path": "scripts/listener_old.py"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] README.md:197: chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/imap-idle.json  # File permissions",
      "file_path": "README.md"
    }
  ]
}