⚠️ Hazard Flags
EXEC PRIVILEGED FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES CREDS_KEYCHAIN ACT_SEND_MESSAGE PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS
📋 Capabilities
Execution
- ✅ Shell execution
- ❌ Code execution
- ❌ Install dependencies
- ❌ Persistence
- Privilege: admin
Filesystem
- ✅ Read workspace
- ❌ Write workspace
- ✅ Read home
- ❌ Write home
- ❌ Read system
- ✅ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- ❌ Ingress
Credentials
- ✅ Environment vars
- ✅ Credential files
- ❌ Browser data
- ✅ Keychain
Actions
✅ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external
🔒 Containment
Level: maximum
Required:
- APPROVE_SEND: Can send messages
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
⚡ Risks
Cloud credential access patterns in: scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py high
Mitigation: Verify legitimate need for cloud credential access.
Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/_internal/py/discord-bridge.py, scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh high
Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.
Hardcoded secrets detected in: scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py, scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py high
Mitigation: Remove hardcoded secrets. Use environment variables instead.
Prompt injection patterns detected in: scripts/_internal/py/codeflow_skill_flow.py, scripts/_internal/bin/enforcer.sh high
Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.
Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP high
Mitigation: Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops
Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION critical
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT high
Mitigation: Remove SQL exploitation patterns.
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES high
Mitigation: Ensure network access is necessary and documented
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
🧠 Deep Analysis — $5.00🚨 Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:@openclaw/codeflow-enforcer:0.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-16T14:18:10.781Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "codeflow",
"version": "0.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": null,
"publisher": "ClawHub",
"source": {
"channel": "clawhub",
"slug": "codeflow",
"owner": "subjadeites",
"downloads": 236,
"stars": 0
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "c99fc152048ab9d249acdb8322ccc2e4cc073148ffc38590775cd2892cf5d3e3",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "admin",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": true
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": true
},
"services": [
{
"service": "messaging",
"operations": [
"read",
"write"
]
}
],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": true,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web",
"documents"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 3,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"PRIVILEGED",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_DELETE",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
"ACT_SEND_MESSAGE",
"PI_WEB",
"PI_DOCUMENTS"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "CRED_CLOUD",
"name": "Cloud Credential Access",
"description": "Accesses cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure) in: scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py"
},
{
"code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
"name": "Keychain Access",
"description": "Accesses system keychain in: scripts/_internal/py/discord-bridge.py, scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh"
},
{
"code": "HARDCODED_SECRET",
"name": "Hardcoded Secrets",
"description": "Contains hardcoded secrets/API keys in: scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py, scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py"
},
{
"code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
"name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
"description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: scripts/_internal/py/codeflow_skill_flow.py, scripts/_internal/bin/enforcer.sh"
},
{
"code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
"name": "Privilege Escalation",
"description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: scripts/_internal/py/parse-stream.py"
},
{
"code": "FILE_DELETE",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Can delete files in: scripts/_internal/py/platforms/discord.py, scripts/_internal/py/discord-bridge.py, scripts/_internal/py/codeflow-guard.py, scripts/_internal/bin/review-pr.sh, scripts/_internal/bin/lib.sh, scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh"
},
{
"code": "RESOURCE_ABUSE",
"name": "Resource Abuse Risk",
"description": "RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP detected: Infinite loop without clear exit condition"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: Blind SQL injection, system table access, or stored procedure abuse"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES: HTTP client library imports that enable external communication"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 11 security patterns (38 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "APPROVE_SEND",
"reason": "Can send messages"
},
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Cloud credential access patterns in: scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Verify legitimate need for cloud credential access."
},
{
"risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: scripts/_internal/py/discord-bridge.py, scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
},
{
"risk": "Hardcoded secrets detected in: scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py, scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove hardcoded secrets. Use environment variables instead."
},
{
"risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: scripts/_internal/py/codeflow_skill_flow.py, scripts/_internal/bin/enforcer.sh",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
},
{
"risk": "Resource abuse detected: RESOURCE_ABUSE_INFINITE_LOOP",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Add proper exit conditions or limits to loops"
},
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove SQL exploitation patterns."
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS, DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS, DATA_EXFIL_SENSITIVE_FILES",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Ensure network access is necessary and documented"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_telegram_compact_single.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_telegram_compact_single.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_review_parallel_guard_precheck.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_review_parallel_guard_precheck.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_review_custom_prompt_keeps_output_contract.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_review_custom_prompt_keeps_output_contract.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_py_compat.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_py_compat.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_plugin_package_metadata.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_plugin_package_metadata.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_result_full_text.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_result_full_text.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parallel_tasks_parse.py",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parallel_tasks_parse.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SECRET_GITHUB_TOKEN [CRITICAL] scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py:86: secret = \"ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789\"",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SECRET_PASSWORD_VAR [MEDIUM] scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py:86: secret = \"ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789\"",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_parse_stream_output_mode_and_state_window.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_delivery_governor_rate_limit.py:22: def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_delivery_governor_rate_limit.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_delivery_events_and_resume.py:28: def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/tests/test_delivery_events_and_resume.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SECRET_PRIVATE_KEY [CRITICAL] scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py:53: \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\\n[REDACTED]\\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\", out",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/redaction.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/_internal/py/platforms/telegram.py:18: import urllib.request",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/platforms/telegram.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_ENV_VARS [MEDIUM] scripts/_internal/py/platforms/telegram.py:43: tok = (os.environ.get(\"TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN\") or \"\").strip()",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/platforms/telegram.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/_internal/py/platforms/telegram.py:237: time.sleep(max(0.0, float(retry_after)))",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/platforms/telegram.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS [MEDIUM] scripts/_internal/py/platforms/discord.py:14: import urllib.request",
"file_path": "scripts/_internal/py/platforms/discord.py"
}
]
}