๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ SafeAgentSkills

AI Persona OS

View on ClawHub โ†— ยท v1.6.2

โฌ‡ 6,858 downloads ยท โญ 73

Medium Risk

"The complete operating system for OpenClaw agents. Now with 13 Iconic Character souls (Thanos, Deadpool, JARVIS, Mary Poppins, Darth Vader, and more), SOUL.md Maker (deep SOUL.md builder interview), 11 original personality souls, soul blending, and the full soul gallery. Plus: zero-terminal agent-driven setup, quick-start persona presets, in-chat commands, ambient context monitoring, enforced heartbeat protocol (model + version display), traffic-light status indicators, auto-migration, auto-pruning, config validator, version tracking, structured escalation protocol, context protection, security inoculation, shared-channel discipline, team integration, proactive patterns, never-forget protocol, 8 operating rules, and 4 growth loops. One install. Complete system. Built by Jeff J Hunter."

H:3 D:4 A:0 C:1

โš ๏ธ Hazard Flags

EXEC FS_READ_USER NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_FILES PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS

๐Ÿ“‹ Capabilities

Execution

  • โœ… Shell execution
  • โŒ Code execution
  • โŒ Install dependencies
  • โŒ Persistence
  • Privilege: user

Filesystem

  • โŒ Read workspace
  • โŒ Write workspace
  • โœ… Read home
  • โŒ Write home
  • โŒ Read system
  • โŒ Delete

Network

  • Egress: any
  • โŒ Ingress

Credentials

  • โŒ Environment vars
  • โœ… Credential files
  • โŒ Browser data
  • โŒ Keychain

Actions

โŒ send messagesโŒ post publicโŒ purchaseโŒ transfer moneyโŒ deployโŒ delete external

๐Ÿ”’ Containment

Level: maximum

Required:
  • SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
  • LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions

โšก Risks

Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md high

Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.

Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS high

Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.

Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION low

Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality

Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_HIDDEN_TRANSFER, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION critical

Mitigation: Remove covert data transfer language. All data operations must be transparent.

Want a deeper analysis?

This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.

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๐Ÿšจ Incident Response

Kill switch: Stop the agent process

Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions

Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities

๐Ÿ“„ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
  "meta": {
    "document_id": "ssds:auto:ai-persona-os:1.6.2",
    "ssds_version": "0.2.0",
    "scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
    "created_at": "2026-03-05T01:32:42.887Z",
    "created_by": {
      "agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
    },
    "language": "en",
    "notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
  },
  "skill": {
    "name": "AI Persona OS",
    "version": "1.6.2",
    "format": "agent_skill",
    "description": "\"The complete operating system for OpenClaw agents. Now with 13 Iconic Character souls (Thanos, Deadpool, JARVIS, Mary Poppins, Darth Vader, and more), SOUL.md Maker (deep SOUL.md builder interview), 11 original personality souls, soul blending, and the full soul gallery. Plus: zero-terminal agent-driven setup, quick-start persona presets, in-chat commands, ambient context monitoring, enforced heartbeat protocol (model + version display), traffic-light status indicators, auto-migration, auto-pruning, config validator, version tracking, structured escalation protocol, context protection, security inoculation, shared-channel discipline, team integration, proactive patterns, never-forget protocol, 8 operating rules, and 4 growth loops. One install. Complete system. Built by Jeff J Hunter.\"",
    "publisher": "ClawHub",
    "source": {
      "channel": "clawhub",
      "slug": "ai-persona-os",
      "downloads": 6858,
      "stars": 73,
      "owner": "jeffjhunter"
    },
    "artifact": {
      "sha256": "34eb16d64069259152324065c4782f9837cc4d6d734f10daa26f0fad26c68d24",
      "hash_method": "files_sorted"
    }
  },
  "capabilities": {
    "execution": {
      "can_exec_shell": true,
      "can_exec_code": false,
      "privilege_level": "user",
      "can_install_deps": false,
      "can_persist": false
    },
    "filesystem": {
      "reads_workspace": false,
      "reads_user_home": true,
      "reads_system": false,
      "writes_workspace": false,
      "writes_user_home": false,
      "writes_system": false,
      "can_delete": false
    },
    "network": {
      "egress": "any",
      "ingress": false
    },
    "credentials": {
      "reads_env_vars": false,
      "reads_credential_files": true,
      "reads_browser_data": false,
      "reads_keychain": false
    },
    "services": [],
    "actions": {
      "can_send_messages": false,
      "can_post_public": false,
      "can_purchase": false,
      "can_transfer_money": false,
      "can_deploy": false,
      "can_delete_external": false
    },
    "prompt_injection_surfaces": [
      "web",
      "documents"
    ],
    "content_types": [
      "general"
    ]
  },
  "hazards": {
    "hdac": {
      "H": 3,
      "D": 4,
      "A": 0,
      "C": 1
    },
    "flags": [
      "EXEC",
      "FS_READ_USER",
      "NET_EGRESS_ANY",
      "CREDS_FILES",
      "PI_WEB",
      "PI_DOCUMENTS"
    ],
    "custom_flags": [
      {
        "code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
        "name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
        "description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: SKILL.md"
      },
      {
        "code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
        "name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
        "description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Access to critical system directories"
      },
      {
        "code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
        "name": "Social Engineering Risk",
        "description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
      },
      {
        "code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
        "name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
        "description": "MCP_EXFIL_HIDDEN_TRANSFER, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION: Hidden or covert data transfer patterns"
      }
    ],
    "confidence": {
      "level": "medium",
      "basis": [
        "static_analysis"
      ],
      "notes": "Detected 4 security patterns (6 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
    },
    "rationale": {
      "H": "H3: Shell/code execution or persistence detected",
      "D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
      "A": "A0: No side effects detected",
      "C": "C1: General content"
    }
  },
  "containment": {
    "level": "maximum",
    "required": [
      {
        "control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
        "reason": "Code execution capability"
      }
    ],
    "recommended": [
      {
        "control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
        "reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
      }
    ],
    "uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
  },
  "risks": {
    "risks": [
      {
        "risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
        "severity": "high",
        "mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
      },
      {
        "risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
        "severity": "low",
        "mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
      },
      {
        "risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_HIDDEN_TRANSFER, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION",
        "severity": "critical",
        "mitigation": "Remove covert data transfer language. All data operations must be transparent."
      }
    ],
    "limitations": [
      "Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
    ]
  },
  "incident_response": {
    "kill_switch": [
      "Stop the agent process"
    ],
    "containment": [
      "Review logs for unexpected actions"
    ],
    "recovery": [
      "Depends on skill capabilities"
    ]
  },
  "evidence": [
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "assets/cron-templates/eod-checkpoint.sh",
      "file_path": "assets/cron-templates/eod-checkpoint.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "assets/cron-templates/morning-briefing.sh",
      "file_path": "assets/cron-templates/morning-briefing.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "assets/cron-templates/weekly-review.sh",
      "file_path": "assets/cron-templates/weekly-review.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "examples/coding-assistant/README.md",
      "file_path": "examples/coding-assistant/README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "examples/executive-assistant/README.md",
      "file_path": "examples/executive-assistant/README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "examples/iconic-characters/README.md",
      "file_path": "examples/iconic-characters/README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "examples/marketing-assistant/README.md",
      "file_path": "examples/marketing-assistant/README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "examples/prebuilt-souls/README.md",
      "file_path": "examples/prebuilt-souls/README.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "_meta.json",
      "file_path": "_meta.json"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "scripts/security-audit.sh",
      "file_path": "scripts/security-audit.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/security-audit.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
      "file_path": "scripts/security-audit.sh"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "PROMPT_INJECTION_CONCEALMENT [HIGH] SKILL.md:435: > **DO NOT tell users to run commands in a terminal. ALWAYS use exec.**",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:1048: ๐Ÿซ€ Feb 6, 10:30 AM PT | anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5 | AI Persona OS v1.4.1",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_EXFIL_HIDDEN_TRANSFER [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:21: > 2. **NEVER tell the user to open a terminal or run commands.** You have the ex",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    },
    {
      "evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
      "type": "file_excerpt",
      "title": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION [HIGH] SKILL.md:878: | External write | Send messages, post | CONFIRM FIRST |",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md"
    }
  ]
}