High Risk
Read posts and comments from Telegram channels via MTProto (Pyrogram or Telethon). Fetch recent messages and discussion replies from public or private channels by time window.
H:4 D:4 A:0 C:1
⚠️ Hazard Flags
EXEC PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES CREDS_KEYCHAIN PI_WEB PI_DOCUMENTS
📋 Capabilities
Execution
- ✅ Shell execution
- ❌ Code execution
- ❌ Install dependencies
- ✅ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- ✅ Read workspace
- ❌ Write workspace
- ✅ Read home
- ❌ Write home
- ❌ Read system
- ✅ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- ❌ Ingress
Credentials
- ✅ Environment vars
- ✅ Credential files
- ❌ Browser data
- ✅ Keychain
Actions
❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external
🔒 Containment
Level: maximum
Required:
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
⚡ Risks
Keychain/credential store access in: README.md high
Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.
Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md high
Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.
Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD critical
Mitigation: Remove system modification commands
Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, MCP_SQL_BLIND critical
Mitigation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval()
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high
Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.
Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION high
Mitigation: Remove references to exfiltrating conversation data or monitoring input.
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
🧠 Deep Analysis — $5.00🚨 Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:sergei-mikhailov-tg-channel-reader:0.9.2",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-06T14:46:50.125Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "Telegram Channel Reader",
"version": "0.9.2",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "Read posts and comments from Telegram channels via MTProto (Pyrogram or Telethon). Fetch recent messages and discussion replies from public or private channels by time window.",
"publisher": "ClawHub",
"source": {
"channel": "clawhub",
"slug": "sergei-mikhailov-tg-channel-reader",
"owner": "bzSega",
"downloads": 521,
"stars": 0
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "5dcbb68ed333ad58758e77b50cddd5291d84150a4f64d4efc21c89f40b90e832",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": true
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": true
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": true
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web",
"documents"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 0,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"PERSISTENCE",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_DELETE",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
"PI_WEB",
"PI_DOCUMENTS"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
"name": "Keychain Access",
"description": "Accesses system keychain in: README.md"
},
{
"code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
"name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
"description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "PERSISTENCE",
"name": "Persistence Mechanism",
"description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: SKILL.md, README.md"
},
{
"code": "FILE_DELETE",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Can delete files in: debug_auth.py"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD: Modifying system permissions or configuration"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, MCP_SQL_BLIND: Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_POISONING",
"name": "Tool Poisoning",
"description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION: Conversation, clipboard, or keystroke exfiltration patterns"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 9 security patterns (16 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A0: No side effects detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: README.md",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
},
{
"risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
},
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Remove system modification commands"
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, MCP_SQL_BLIND",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval()"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove references to exfiltrating conversation data or monitoring input."
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "tg_state.py",
"file_path": "tg_state.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "tg_reader_unified.py",
"file_path": "tg_reader_unified.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "tg_check.py",
"file_path": "tg_check.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "test_session.py",
"file_path": "test_session.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "setup.py",
"file_path": "setup.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "setup-tg-reader.sh",
"file_path": "setup-tg-reader.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "README.md",
"file_path": "README.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "reader.py",
"file_path": "reader.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL [CRITICAL] tg_check.py:240: mod = __import__(name)",
"file_path": "tg_check.py"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] SKILL.md:428: chmod 600 ~/.tg-reader.json",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:72: > **`tg-reader: command not found`?** Run `bash setup-tg-reader.sh` from the ski",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE [HIGH] SKILL.md:422: cat > ~/.tg-reader.json << 'EOF'",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] setup-tg-reader.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
"file_path": "setup-tg-reader.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SCRIPT_ANSI_DECEPTION [HIGH] setup-tg-reader.sh:21: RED='\\033[0;31m'",
"file_path": "setup-tg-reader.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] setup-tg-reader.sh:21: RED='\\033[0;31m'",
"file_path": "setup-tg-reader.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION [CRITICAL] README.md:96: chmod 600 ~/.tg-reader.json",
"file_path": "README.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] README.md:40: pip install pyrogram tgcrypto telethon",
"file_path": "README.md"
}
]
}