High Risk
"Query and manage the operator's calendar — check availability and create new entries"
H:4 D:4 A:3 C:1
⚠️ Hazard Flags
EXEC CODE_EXEC PRIVILEGED PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_WRITE_SYSTEM NET_EGRESS_ANY NET_INGRESS CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES CREDS_BROWSER ACT_SEND_MESSAGE PI_WEB
📋 Capabilities
Execution
- ✅ Shell execution
- ✅ Code execution
- ✅ Install dependencies
- ✅ Persistence
- Privilege: admin
Filesystem
- ✅ Read workspace
- ✅ Write workspace
- ✅ Read home
- ✅ Write home
- ❌ Read system
- ❌ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- ✅ Ingress
Credentials
- ✅ Environment vars
- ✅ Credential files
- ✅ Browser data
- ❌ Keychain
Actions
✅ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external
🔒 Containment
Level: maximum
Required:
- APPROVE_SEND: Can send messages
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
⚡ Risks
Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL high
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Command injection risk: MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS, MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL critical
Mitigation: Remove embedded script tags and encoded payloads.
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION high
Mitigation: Remove references to exfiltrating conversation data or monitoring input.
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
🧠 Deep Analysis — $5.00🚨 Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:calendar:1.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-08T12:24:12.899Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "Phone Voice Assistant - Amber",
"version": "1.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "\"Query and manage the operator's calendar — check availability and create new entries\"",
"publisher": "ClawHub",
"source": {
"channel": "clawhub",
"slug": "amber-voice-assistant",
"owner": "batthis",
"downloads": 1130,
"stars": 4
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "f3a6f45267f316eab41dc49f8f293a9ef143a2ac30b37ccd31c95c5da8870f61",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": true,
"privilege_level": "admin",
"can_install_deps": true,
"can_persist": true
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": true,
"writes_user_home": true,
"writes_system": true,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": true
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": true,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [
{
"service": "messaging",
"operations": [
"read",
"write"
]
}
],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": true,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 3,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"CODE_EXEC",
"PRIVILEGED",
"PERSISTENCE",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
"FS_WRITE_USER",
"FS_WRITE_SYSTEM",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"NET_INGRESS",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"CREDS_BROWSER",
"ACT_SEND_MESSAGE",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "PERSISTENCE",
"name": "Persistence Mechanism",
"description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: runtime/scripts/dist-watcher.cjs, README.md"
},
{
"code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
"name": "Privilege Escalation",
"description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: SKILL.md, runtime/setup-wizard.js, README.md"
},
{
"code": "NET_INGRESS",
"name": "Network Server",
"description": "Listens for incoming connections in: runtime/src/index.ts, dashboard/scripts/serve.js"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS, MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL: Script tags, VBScript, or encoded script data URIs"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION: Conversation, clipboard, or keystroke exfiltration patterns"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (23 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "APPROVE_SEND",
"reason": "Can send messages"
},
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS, MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Remove embedded script tags and encoded payloads."
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove references to exfiltrating conversation data or monitoring input."
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/validate_voice_env.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/validate_voice_env.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/setup_quickstart.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/setup_quickstart.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "runtime/src/skills/types.ts",
"file_path": "runtime/src/skills/types.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "runtime/src/skills/router.ts",
"file_path": "runtime/src/skills/router.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "runtime/src/skills/loader.ts",
"file_path": "runtime/src/skills/loader.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "runtime/src/skills/index.ts",
"file_path": "runtime/src/skills/index.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "runtime/src/skills/api.ts",
"file_path": "runtime/src/skills/api.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "runtime/src/providers/types.ts",
"file_path": "runtime/src/providers/types.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION [HIGH] SKILL.md:30: - **Amber Skills** (`amber-skills/`) — modular mid-call capabilities (CRM, calen",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/validate_voice_env.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
"file_path": "scripts/validate_voice_env.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/setup_quickstart.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
"file_path": "scripts/setup_quickstart.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "TIRITH_ANSI_ESCAPE_IN_STRING [HIGH] runtime/setup-wizard.js:14: reset: '\\x1b[0m',",
"file_path": "runtime/setup-wizard.js"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION [HIGH] README.md:113: ### 📬 Log & Forward Message",
"file_path": "README.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] packaging/cowork/skills/phone-calls/SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "packaging/cowork/skills/phone-calls/SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] packaging/cowork/skills/crm/SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "packaging/cowork/skills/crm/SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] packaging/cowork/skills/contacts/SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "packaging/cowork/skills/contacts/SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] packaging/cowork/skills/call-screening/SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "packaging/cowork/skills/call-screening/SKILL.md"
}
]
}