High Risk
MCP integration for Telegram via telebiz-tt browser client
H:4 D:4 A:3 C:1
⚠️ Hazard Flags
EXEC PERSISTENCE FS_READ_WORKSPACE FS_READ_USER FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE FS_WRITE_USER FS_WRITE_SYSTEM FS_DELETE NET_EGRESS_ANY NET_INGRESS CREDS_ENV CREDS_FILES ACT_SEND_MESSAGE PI_WEB
📋 Capabilities
Execution
- ✅ Shell execution
- ❌ Code execution
- ✅ Install dependencies
- ✅ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- ✅ Read workspace
- ✅ Write workspace
- ✅ Read home
- ✅ Write home
- ❌ Read system
- ✅ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- ✅ Ingress
Credentials
- ✅ Environment vars
- ✅ Credential files
- ❌ Browser data
- ❌ Keychain
Actions
✅ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external
🔒 Containment
Level: maximum
Required:
- APPROVE_SEND: Can send messages
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
⚡ Risks
Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_PROCESS_MANIPULATION, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL high
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT medium
Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION high
Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
🧠 Deep Analysis — $5.00🚨 Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:telebiz-mcp:1.0.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-28T09:12:36.951Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "Telebiz Mcp",
"version": "1.0.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "MCP integration for Telegram via telebiz-tt browser client",
"publisher": "ClawHub",
"source": {
"channel": "clawhub",
"slug": "telebiz-mcp-skill",
"owner": "acastellana",
"downloads": 1431,
"stars": 0
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "bf0cccf220068d5d574df8d1c6386af5c868bd46c911591d5f502d0fb8de743c",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": true,
"can_persist": true
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": true,
"writes_user_home": true,
"writes_system": true,
"can_delete": true
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": true
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": true,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 3,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"PERSISTENCE",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
"FS_WRITE_USER",
"FS_WRITE_SYSTEM",
"FS_DELETE",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"NET_INGRESS",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"ACT_SEND_MESSAGE",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "PERSISTENCE",
"name": "Persistence Mechanism",
"description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "FILE_DELETE",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Can delete files in: src/daemon.ts, dist/daemon.js"
},
{
"code": "NET_INGRESS",
"name": "Network Server",
"description": "Listens for incoming connections in: src/http-server.ts, src/daemon.ts, dist/http-server.js, dist/daemon.js"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_PROCESS_MANIPULATION, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 7 security patterns (10 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "APPROVE_SEND",
"reason": "Can send messages"
},
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_PROCESS_MANIPULATION, INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
"severity": "medium",
"mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS, MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "telebiz-service.sh",
"file_path": "telebiz-service.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "start-relay.sh",
"file_path": "start-relay.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "start-http.sh",
"file_path": "start-http.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "src/relay.ts",
"file_path": "src/relay.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "src/monitor.ts",
"file_path": "src/monitor.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "src/mcp-server.ts",
"file_path": "src/mcp-server.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "src/http-server.ts",
"file_path": "src/http-server.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "src/health.ts",
"file_path": "src/health.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "src/daemon.ts",
"file_path": "src/daemon.ts"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] telebiz-service.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "telebiz-service.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_PROCESS_MANIPULATION [HIGH] telebiz-service.sh:46: pkill -f \"telebiz-mcp\" 2>/dev/null",
"file_path": "telebiz-service.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] start-relay.sh:5: cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\"",
"file_path": "start-relay.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] start-relay.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "start-relay.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] start-http.sh:5: cd \"$(dirname \"$0\")\"",
"file_path": "start-http.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] start-http.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "start-http.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:42: npm install -g @telebiz/telebiz-mcp",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:161: | `sendMessage` | Send text message (markdown supported) |",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION [HIGH] SKILL.md:3: description: Access Telegram data via MCP using the telebiz-tt browser client. L",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
}
]
}