High Risk
Email API for AI agents. Check inbox, read emails, extract OTP codes, search messages via ShellMail. Trigger on "check email", "inbox", "otp", "verification code", "shellmail", or any email-related requests.
H:4 D:4 A:0 C:1
⚠️ Hazard Flags
EXEC NET_EGRESS_ANY CREDS_ENV PI_WEB
📋 Capabilities
Execution
- ✅ Shell execution
- ❌ Code execution
- ❌ Install dependencies
- ❌ Persistence
- Privilege: user
Filesystem
- ❌ Read workspace
- ❌ Write workspace
- ❌ Read home
- ❌ Write home
- ❌ Read system
- ❌ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- ❌ Ingress
Credentials
- ✅ Environment vars
- ❌ Credential files
- ❌ Browser data
- ❌ Keychain
Actions
❌ send messages❌ post public❌ purchase❌ transfer money❌ deploy❌ delete external
🔒 Containment
Level: maximum
Required:
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
Recommended:
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
⚡ Risks
Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS high
Mitigation: Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary.
Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT medium
Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands
Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION low
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA) high
Mitigation: Remove references to sensitive data collection.
Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS high
Mitigation: Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions
Want a deeper analysis?
This report was generated by static analysis. Get an LLM-powered deep review with behavioral reasoning and attack surface mapping.
🧠 Deep Analysis — $5.00🚨 Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
📄 Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:shellmail:1.0.12",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-28T09:33:33.542Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "ShellMail - Email Built for AI Agents",
"version": "1.0.12",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "Email API for AI agents. Check inbox, read emails, extract OTP codes, search messages via ShellMail. Trigger on \"check email\", \"inbox\", \"otp\", \"verification code\", \"shellmail\", or any email-related requests.",
"publisher": "ClawHub",
"source": {
"channel": "clawhub",
"slug": "shellmail",
"owner": "aaronbatchelder",
"downloads": 266,
"stars": 0
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "7f3541f86c0a463e384339db12d74dec766cee583be2916ac162bbb3e100df8f",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "user",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": false
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": false,
"reads_user_home": false,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": false,
"writes_user_home": false,
"writes_system": false,
"can_delete": false
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": false
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": false,
"reads_browser_data": false,
"reads_keychain": false
},
"services": [],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": false,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 0,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"CREDS_ENV",
"PI_WEB"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS: Access to critical system directories"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT: User input used in command substitution - potential injection risk"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_POISONING",
"name": "Tool Poisoning",
"description": "Hidden secondary behavior detected: MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS: Instructs agent to access sensitive services (email, calendar, contacts, drive)"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 5 security patterns (5 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A0: No side effects detected",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Avoid accessing system directories unless absolutely necessary."
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT",
"severity": "medium",
"mitigation": "Validate and sanitize all user inputs before using in commands"
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Tool poisoning: hidden behaviors detected (MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA)",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove references to sensitive data collection."
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Clearly document which sensitive services are accessed and why; use minimal required permissions"
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/shellmail.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/shellmail.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_SENSITIVE_SERVICE_ACCESS [HIGH] SKILL.md:95: ### Read Email",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_TOOL_POISONING_SENSITIVE_DATA [HIGH] SKILL.md:112: ### Search Emails",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/shellmail.sh:73: curl -sf \"$API_URL/api/mail/$(urlencode \"$1\")\" -H \"$(auth_header)\"",
"file_path": "scripts/shellmail.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/shellmail.sh:1: #!/usr/bin/env bash",
"file_path": "scripts/shellmail.sh"
}
]
}