Advanced prompt injection defense system for Clawdbot with HiveFence network integration. Protects against direct/indirect injection attacks in group chats with multi-language detection (EN/KO/JA/ZH), severity scoring, automatic logging, and configurable security policies. Connects to the distributed HiveFence threat intelligence network for collective defense.
โ ๏ธ Hazard Flags
๐ Capabilities
Execution
- โ Shell execution
- โ Code execution
- โ Install dependencies
- โ Persistence
- Privilege: admin
Filesystem
- โ Read workspace
- โ Write workspace
- โ Read home
- โ Write home
- โ Read system
- โ Delete
Network
- Egress: any
- โ Ingress
Credentials
- โ Environment vars
- โ Credential files
- โ Browser data
- โ Keychain
Actions
๐ Containment
Level: maximum
- APPROVE_POST: Can post publicly
- SANDBOX_CONTAINER: Code execution capability
- LOG_ACTIONS: Audit trail for all actions
โก Risks
Mitigation: Do not execute. Review source for malicious intent.
Mitigation: This skill attempts to disable security features. Do not use.
Mitigation: Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing.
Mitigation: Block keychain access or use isolated environment.
Mitigation: Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input.
Mitigation: Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments
Mitigation: Remove SQL exploitation patterns.
Mitigation: Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality
Mitigation: Remove references to exfiltrating conversation data or monitoring input.
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๐ง Deep Analysis โ $5.00๐จ Incident Response
Kill switch: Stop the agent process
Containment: Review logs for unexpected actions
Recovery: Depends on skill capabilities
๐ Raw SSDS JSON click to expand
{
"meta": {
"document_id": "ssds:auto:prompt-guard:0.10.0",
"ssds_version": "0.2.0",
"scanner_version": "0.4.0+fe6fd9123d50",
"created_at": "2026-03-06T14:14:58.514Z",
"created_by": {
"agent": "safeagentskills-cli/generate-ssds"
},
"language": "en",
"notes": "Auto-generated SSDS. Manual review recommended."
},
"skill": {
"name": "Everclaw โ Inference You Own",
"version": "0.10.0",
"format": "agent_skill",
"description": "Advanced prompt injection defense system for Clawdbot with HiveFence network integration. Protects against direct/indirect injection attacks in group chats with multi-language detection (EN/KO/JA/ZH), severity scoring, automatic logging, and configurable security policies. Connects to the distributed HiveFence threat intelligence network for collective defense.",
"publisher": "ClawHub",
"source": {
"channel": "clawhub",
"slug": "everclaw-inference",
"owner": "DavidAJohnston",
"downloads": 675,
"stars": 0
},
"artifact": {
"sha256": "f514860851c69ab079e75bd896f8e372df57c3fb780afa160975899e2f85cc11",
"hash_method": "files_sorted"
}
},
"capabilities": {
"execution": {
"can_exec_shell": true,
"can_exec_code": false,
"privilege_level": "admin",
"can_install_deps": false,
"can_persist": true
},
"filesystem": {
"reads_workspace": true,
"reads_user_home": true,
"reads_system": false,
"writes_workspace": true,
"writes_user_home": true,
"writes_system": true,
"can_delete": true
},
"network": {
"egress": "any",
"ingress": true
},
"credentials": {
"reads_env_vars": true,
"reads_credential_files": true,
"reads_browser_data": true,
"reads_keychain": true
},
"services": [
{
"service": "code_hosting",
"operations": [
"read",
"write"
]
}
],
"actions": {
"can_send_messages": false,
"can_post_public": true,
"can_purchase": false,
"can_transfer_money": false,
"can_deploy": false,
"can_delete_external": false
},
"prompt_injection_surfaces": [
"web",
"documents"
],
"content_types": [
"general"
]
},
"hazards": {
"hdac": {
"H": 4,
"D": 4,
"A": 3,
"C": 1
},
"flags": [
"EXEC",
"PRIVILEGED",
"PERSISTENCE",
"FS_READ_WORKSPACE",
"FS_READ_USER",
"FS_WRITE_WORKSPACE",
"FS_WRITE_USER",
"FS_WRITE_SYSTEM",
"FS_DELETE",
"NET_EGRESS_ANY",
"NET_INGRESS",
"CREDS_ENV",
"CREDS_FILES",
"CREDS_BROWSER",
"CREDS_KEYCHAIN",
"ACT_POST_PUBLIC",
"PI_WEB",
"PI_DOCUMENTS"
],
"custom_flags": [
{
"code": "PIPE_TO_SHELL",
"name": "Pipe to Shell",
"description": "Downloads and executes remote code (curl|bash pattern) in: SKILL.md, scripts/swap.sh, scripts/install-with-deps.sh, scripts/install-everclaw.sh, scripts/gateway-guardian.sh, README.md"
},
{
"code": "SECURITY_BYPASS",
"name": "Security Bypass",
"description": "Attempts to disable security features in: prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py"
},
{
"code": "CRED_SSH",
"name": "SSH Key Access",
"description": "Accesses SSH keys in: prompt-guard/SKILL.md, prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py"
},
{
"code": "CRED_BROWSER",
"name": "Browser Profile Access",
"description": "Accesses browser cookies/profiles in: prompt-guard/SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "CRED_KEYCHAIN",
"name": "Keychain Access",
"description": "Accesses system keychain in: SKILL.md, scripts/x402-client.mjs, scripts/swap.sh, scripts/start.sh, scripts/mor-launch-headless.sh, scripts/install-proxy.sh, scripts/everclaw-wallet.mjs, scripts/coingecko-x402.mjs, README.md"
},
{
"code": "PROMPT_INJECTION",
"name": "Prompt Injection Risk",
"description": "Contains prompt injection patterns in: SKILL.md, scripts/router.mjs, scripts/install-proxy.sh, prompt-guard/SKILL.md, prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py, prompt-guard/README.md"
},
{
"code": "HIDDEN_INSTRUCTIONS",
"name": "Hidden Instructions",
"description": "Contains hidden instructions in comments/invisible chars in: SKILL.md"
},
{
"code": "PERSISTENCE",
"name": "Persistence Mechanism",
"description": "Creates scheduled tasks or startup entries in: SKILL.md, scripts/install-proxy.sh, scripts/gateway-guardian.sh, scripts/diagnose.sh, scripts/always-on.sh"
},
{
"code": "PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
"name": "Privilege Escalation",
"description": "Uses elevated privileges (sudo/root) in: SKILL.md, scripts/install-with-deps.sh, scripts/always-on.sh, README.md, prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py, prompt-guard/scripts/audit.py"
},
{
"code": "FILE_DELETE",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Can delete files in: scripts/install.sh, scripts/install-everclaw.sh, scripts/fix-pii-all-repos.sh, scripts/filter-repo-pii.sh, scripts/everclaw-deps.mjs, scripts/bootstrap-gateway.mjs, scripts/bootstrap-everclaw.mjs"
},
{
"code": "NET_INGRESS",
"name": "Network Server",
"description": "Listens for incoming connections in: scripts/morpheus-proxy.mjs"
},
{
"code": "TOOL_ABUSE",
"name": "Unauthorized Tool Use",
"description": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_PROCESS_MANIPULATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_PACKAGE_INSTALL, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION: Instructs agent to install external binary or package"
},
{
"code": "SOCIAL_ENGINEERING",
"name": "Social Engineering Risk",
"description": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION: Skill description is too vague or missing"
},
{
"code": "COMMAND_INJECTION",
"name": "Command Injection Risk",
"description": "MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM, MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS: Blind SQL injection, system table access, or stored procedure abuse"
},
{
"code": "DATA_EXFILTRATION",
"name": "Data Exfiltration Risk",
"description": "MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION, DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS: Conversation, clipboard, or keystroke exfiltration patterns"
}
],
"confidence": {
"level": "medium",
"basis": [
"static_analysis"
],
"notes": "Detected 15 security patterns (72 vendored rule hits). Review recommended."
},
"rationale": {
"H": "H4: Critical: Privilege escalation or malware detected",
"D": "D4: Critical: Credential theft or data exfiltration",
"A": "A3: External actions (deploy/message/post)",
"C": "C1: General content"
}
},
"containment": {
"level": "maximum",
"required": [
{
"control": "APPROVE_POST",
"reason": "Can post publicly"
},
{
"control": "SANDBOX_CONTAINER",
"reason": "Code execution capability"
}
],
"recommended": [
{
"control": "LOG_ACTIONS",
"reason": "Audit trail for all actions"
}
],
"uncontained_risk": "Risk level depends on manual review of actual capabilities."
},
"risks": {
"risks": [
{
"risk": "Pipe-to-shell pattern detected (curl|bash) in: SKILL.md, scripts/swap.sh, scripts/install-with-deps.sh, scripts/install-everclaw.sh, scripts/gateway-guardian.sh, README.md",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Do not execute. Review source for malicious intent."
},
{
"risk": "Security bypass pattern detected in: prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "This skill attempts to disable security features. Do not use."
},
{
"risk": "SSH key access patterns in: prompt-guard/SKILL.md, prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Verify legitimate need for SSH access. Consider sandboxing."
},
{
"risk": "Keychain/credential store access in: SKILL.md, scripts/x402-client.mjs, scripts/swap.sh, scripts/start.sh, scripts/mor-launch-headless.sh, scripts/install-proxy.sh, scripts/everclaw-wallet.mjs, scripts/coingecko-x402.mjs, README.md",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Block keychain access or use isolated environment."
},
{
"risk": "Prompt injection patterns detected in: SKILL.md, scripts/router.mjs, scripts/install-proxy.sh, prompt-guard/SKILL.md, prompt-guard/scripts/detect.py, prompt-guard/README.md",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Review SKILL.md for hidden instructions. Do not use with untrusted input."
},
{
"risk": "Unauthorized tool use: INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL, INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD, MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS, MCP_SYS_PROCESS_MANIPULATION, MCP_SYS_FILE_DESTRUCTION, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_PACKAGE_INSTALL, TOOL_ABUSE_SYSTEM_MODIFICATION, MCP_SYS_PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Avoid instructing agents to install arbitrary binaries; bundle dependencies or use sandboxed environments"
},
{
"risk": "Command injection risk: MCP_SQL_BLIND, COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT, TIRITH_DOTFILE_OVERWRITE, MCP_CMD_DANGEROUS_SYSTEM, MCP_SCRIPT_TAGS",
"severity": "critical",
"mitigation": "Remove SQL exploitation patterns."
},
{
"risk": "Social engineering indicators: SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION, SOCIAL_ENG_ANTHROPIC_IMPERSONATION",
"severity": "low",
"mitigation": "Provide clear, detailed description of skill functionality"
},
{
"risk": "Data exfiltration patterns: MCP_EXFIL_CONVERSATION, DATA_EXFIL_NETWORK_REQUESTS",
"severity": "high",
"mitigation": "Remove references to exfiltrating conversation data or monitoring input."
}
],
"limitations": [
"Static analysis only - runtime behavior not verified"
]
},
"incident_response": {
"kill_switch": [
"Stop the agent process"
],
"containment": [
"Review logs for unexpected actions"
],
"recovery": [
"Depends on skill capabilities"
]
},
"evidence": [
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "_meta.json",
"file_path": "_meta.json"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SKILL.md",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/x402-client.mjs",
"file_path": "scripts/x402-client.mjs"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/venice-key-monitor.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/venice-key-monitor.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/venice-402-watchdog.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/venice-402-watchdog.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/swap.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/swap.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/stop.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/stop.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/start.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/start.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/setup.mjs",
"file_path": "scripts/setup.mjs"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:file-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "scripts/session.sh",
"file_path": "scripts/session.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-1",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_BINARY_INSTALL [HIGH] SKILL.md:63: note: \"curl | bash installer available but users should review scripts before ex",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-2",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "INSTRUCTED_GIT_CLONE_AND_BUILD [MEDIUM] SKILL.md:276: git clone https://github.com/profbernardoj/everclaw.git ~/.openclaw/workspace/sk",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-3",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION [LOW] SKILL.md:1: ---",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-4",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] SKILL.md:1975: # Configure macOS to never sleep (requires sudo)",
"file_path": "SKILL.md"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-5",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/venice-key-monitor.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "scripts/venice-key-monitor.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-6",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/venice-402-watchdog.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "scripts/venice-402-watchdog.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-7",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "COMMAND_INJECTION_USER_INPUT [MEDIUM] scripts/swap.sh:138: TX_HASH=$(echo \"$RESULT\" | grep \"transactionHash\" | awk '{print $2}')",
"file_path": "scripts/swap.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-8",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/swap.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "scripts/swap.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-9",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SQL_BLIND [HIGH] scripts/swap.sh:87: # Check if cast (Foundry) is available",
"file_path": "scripts/swap.sh"
},
{
"evidence_id": "EV:cisco-10",
"type": "file_excerpt",
"title": "MCP_SYS_CRITICAL_ACCESS [HIGH] scripts/stop.sh:1: #!/bin/bash",
"file_path": "scripts/stop.sh"
}
]
}